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This study uses the principal–agent framework to investigate the trade-off between
the benefits of internal control stemming from a reduction of the losses from inap-
propriate employee actions and the costs of implementing it brought about by the
possibility of collusion that it creates. It is shown that, when the agents find it rela-
tively easy to collude, implementing internal control reduces agency welfare, defined
as the sum of expected payments accruing to the principal and the agents, even as,
with positive transaction costs of collusion, it improves productive efficiency, defined
as the expected output. As a result, the principal, under certain conditions, finds
it in her best interest to use internal control as a threat instead of implementing
it. When this is the case, the principal sometimes prefers to decrease the accuracy
vi
of the accounting information system. The analysis of the agents’ side contracting
indicates that, even if the principal can prevent explicit collusion, for some values
of parameters the possibility of tacit collusion still results in a loss. The study also
investigates the effect of the choice of organizational form on the value of internal
control. The analysis of two different versions of the model demonstrates that, for a
wide range of parameters, creating a hierarchical structure reduces, albeit does not
eliminate, the loss from collusion — i.e., internal control and hierarchical delegation
are complementary instruments of organizational design. It is also shown that, when
one agent is ex ante more likely to be efficient than the other, in most cases the
principal optimally appoints to the supervisory position the one who is less likely
to be efficient. As a result, the supervisor, in expectation, exerts a lower effort level
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Internal control is a valuable tool of corporate governance that has long been used
by companies to reduce the losses from employee fraud and improve productivity by
minimizing the occurrence of both intentional and unintentional errors. The recent
series of corporate scandals, of which Enron and WorldCom are but two prominent
examples, and especially the ensuing legislation that included the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 (SOX), have rekindled the interest in internal control, on the part
of both practitioners and researchers, as a means of restoring investors’ trust in
financial markets. The purpose of this study is to extend the literature documenting
the practice of internal control by using the tools from the managerial economics
toolbox to study two important properties: (i) the effect of internal control on the
welfare of both shareholders and employees and (ii) the effect of the organizational
structure on the value of internal control to the shareholders.
From the viewpoint of managerial economics — and, more specifically, the
principal–agent framework — internal control is a mechanism that helps reduce
the losses stemming from information asymmetries between principals and agents.
For the most part, the literature on internal control in organizations (and control in
general) has focused on identifying and quantifying the benefits that it brings about,
the costs involved in implementing it, and the best practices of increasing the former
and reducing the latter. Since internal control is often considered primarily as an
instrument of preventing employee malfeasance (although a broader view of internal
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control as an integral part of enterprise risk management has been advocated of
late: see, e.g., COSO, 2004), the benefits often reflect the reduction of the loss from
fraud. Various efficiency improvements, including the positive effect on financial
reporting, are also considered among the benefits. The costs of internal control
reflect, among other things, the waste of time required to get decisions approved,
reduced motivation when employees construe the presence of control as lack of trust
(see, e.g., Falk and Kosfeld, 2006), or actions taken by the controlled parties with a
view to circumventing it.
In Chapter 2, I focus on the latter category of costs and show that, even when
internal control itself does not involve any unproductive waste of resources, the
attempts to circumvent it by the employees reduce efficiency when the employees
being controlled find it relatively easy to collude. That is, when collusion is easy, the
principal (representing the board, which acts on behalf of the shareholders) finds it in
her best interest to use internal control as a threat instead of actually implementing
it.1 The intuition behind the result is that, in response to internal control, the
agents (representing employees) take actions so as to minimize their loss — and
these actions affect not just their reporting strategies but their productive outputs
as well. The mechanism captured by the model is similar in spirit to the well-
known effect of financial reporting requirements on the economic decisions of the
reporting entity, where the managers manipulate not just the reported figures but
the underlying economic transactions as well. The vulnerability of internal control to
collusion has long been pointed out by both practitioners and accounting researchers
(see, e.g., Carmichael, 1970, and Kinney, 2000a): in fact, implementing internal
control virtually always creates the possibility of collusion between (or among) the
employees involved in it. To the best of my knowledge, however, the investigation
of the effect of internal control and collusion that it brings about on productive and
allocative efficiency presented in Chapter 2 is new.
To investigate the mechanism through which collusion reduces the value of in-
ternal control, I consider, in Chapter 3, the benchmark setting where communication
between the agents is impossible and show that, for a wide range of parameters, the
principal can attain the first-best allocation — i.e., eliminate the loss from explicit
1Throughout the dissertation, I use feminine gender to refer to principals and masculine gender
to refer to agents.
2
collusion altogether. Nonetheless, in many circumstances the possibility of tacit
collusion, where the agents do not coordinate their actions but still take improper
advantage of the information asymmetry, remains. The analysis of the benchmark
case demonstrates that the most effective way of improving the value of internal
control involves disrupting the agents’ negotiations over their collusive agreement,
or side contract. Several avenues toward this end have been proposed in the liter-
ature: see, e.g., Beck (1986) and the references in Chapter 2. In real-life settings,
however, the principal will have at best a limited influence on the informal dealings
among the employees. On the other hand, she will usually have access to another
instrument that has a bearing on how easy it is for the agents to collude: the choice
of the organizational form. I explore this possibility in Chapter 4.
Internal controls observed in practice often involve employees occupying differ-
ent rungs of the hierarchical ladder. A textbook example (see McWatters, Morse,
and Zimmerman, 2001, p. 182) involves a lower-level employee responsible for ini-
tiating a transaction and the supervisor ratifying it. The cases where it is the
subordinate who, in effect, controls the boss by, e.g., being a co-signatory on finan-
cial documents, are also well-known. In Chapter 4, I investigate the effect of the
organizational form chosen by the principal on the value of internal control. The
analysis of two different organizational arrangements demonstrates that in many cir-
cumstances internal control is, indeed, more valuable in a hierarchical setting — even
though by creating it and delegating to the supervisor contracting with the lower-
level agent, the principal loses some flexibility in contracting with the latter. The
main result reported in Chapter 4 is that, for a wide range of parameters, internal
control and hierarchical structure (i.e., delegation) are complementary instruments.
That is, even in the absence of technological reasons to create a hierarchical struc-
ture, putting one in place is often justified because it increases the value of internal
control. I also show that, when one of the agents is more likely to be efficient (in
the sense to be defined presently) than the other, the principal usually appoints to
the supervisory position the one who is less likely to be efficient because an efficient
supervisor collects a higher information rent than an efficient subordinate.
The results reported in this dissertation further our understanding of inter-
nal control as an instrument of corporate governance and, more specifically, of the
mechanisms through which the choice of the organizational form determines its
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value. The analysis shows, in particular, that in most cases eliminating collusion
altogether is infeasible, unless the principal can “sell” the business to the supervi-
sor — but the benefits from internal control exceed the losses from collusion. The
model also highlights the important difference between internal control and control
in general, which has been investigated by organizational researchers for more than
a century. The latter can be thought of as involving a continuous and direct inter-
action between the controller (the principal) and the controlled (the agent), while
in the former the continuous interaction typically takes place between the supervi-
sor and the agent — i.e., “below the radar” of the principal, who intervenes only
when the internal control system signals the presence of a problem. The advantages
of internal control can then be explained in terms of reduction of the burden of
information processing carried out by the principal.
Since reviewing the voluminous literature on internal control in its entirety
is beyond the scope of this dissertation, I only quote the sources that are directly
related to the modeling approach adopted here. For a thorough review of the ac-
counting literature on internal control the reader is referred to Jones (1996). It
should be noted, however, that the topic in question is quite broad and straddles
several academic disciplines including law, management science, and industrial or-
ganization, among others. For example, Lewis and Sappington (1997) and Khalil,
Kim, and Shin (2006) investigate the benefits of separating planning and implemen-
tation, which is a classic example of the segregation of duties, the most-often used
internal controls. A comprehensive review of the literature containing a synthesis
of different approaches adopted by various disciplines has yet to be written.
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Chapter 2
Internal Controls and Efficiency
Recent years have seen renewed interest in internal control as a means of improving
corporate governance in publicly traded companies.1 This interest is, at least in
part, fueled by complaints about the burdens imposed on companies by Section 404
of SOX that requires managers to report on, and external auditors to attest to,
the adequacy of internal controls over financial reporting. The discussion, which
goes on in both the popular and academic press, has centered on the comparison of
benefits and costs of internal control. For example, Committee on Capital Markets
Regulation (2006, p. 115) states:
The key issue is not the statute’s underlying objectives but whether the im-
plementation approach taken by the SEC and the PCAOB (the independent
board established under SOX to set standards for auditors of public compa-
nies) strikes the right cost-benefit balance. There is widespread concern that
the compliance costs of Section 404 are excessive.
The participants in the discussion — especially regulators and practitioners — ap-
pear to agree that internal control brings about significant benefits (e.g., in reducing
1Some authors use the terms internal control and corporate governance interchangeably. For
example, Berkovitch and Israel (1996, p. 210) give the following defintion: “External control refers
to the market for corporate control where managers are replaced and disciplined via takeovers.
Internal control refers to arrangements within the firm, like the control of the board of directors
over the management team and contractual agreements such as bond covenants.” In this study,
I use the term in its strict (accounting) sense, which will be made precise presently.
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the cost of capital: see Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia, 2007, and Ashbaugh-Skaife,
Collins, Kinney, and LaFond, 2006) and focus on quantifying these benefits and
comparing them with costs, which fall into two broad categories: (i) the costs of
implementing and operating internal control and (ii) the costs of reporting on, and
auditing, its effectiveness. Examples of the former include resources expended on
verification, ratification, approval, and similar activities; examples of the latter —
auditors’ fees directly related to auditing internal controls. Compliance costs typi-
cally contain elements of both.
Even though the accurate measurement of these costs remains a challenging
task, their nature is relatively well understood. Yet, as noted by Power (1997),
there is still much confusion in practice about what effective internal controls really
are. In a similar vein, Kinney (2000b) argues that the effect of internal control
on the welfare of management, corporate directors, shareholders, trading partners,
auditors, and society at large remains, to a large degree, unexplored by researchers.
Kinney’s observation is echoed by Maijoor (2000) who also remarks that internal
controls should be studied from a corporate governance perspective. To explicate
the costs and benefits that may, in a cross-sectional empirical study, be obscured by
the above-mentioned compliance costs, I present a model where internal control is
costless to implement and study its effects on productivity and payoffs accruing to
(productive) agents and shareholders.
Internal controls comprise a wide array of policies and procedures ranging from
very traditional, such as installing locks in warehouses, to very innovative, such as
monitoring employees’ computer use in real time (Allison, 2006). As diverse as they
are, however, all known internal controls share one common shortcoming: they are
susceptible to organizational corruption, which is also often referred to as collusion.2
An internal control mechanism may be used for nefarious purposes, such as abuse of
authority, or simply “overridden” by the persons entrusted with implementing it as
a result of collusion (Kinney, 2000a). I leave the former problem for future research
and, in this paper, investigate the latter.
To make the task manageable, I focus on one type of internal control: the often-
used practice of segregation (or separation) of duties, where a business is organized
2The latter term is most often used in the economics literature and has a more precise meaning
than the former. I will use both terms interchangeably.
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in such a way that no single person could carry out any process or transaction in
its entirety. In this type of internal control, the actions of one individual affect the
payoff(s) of his colleague(s). I study a stylized model of a company composed of
a principal, representing shareholders or top management acting on their behalf,
and two agents, representing individual workers or division managers. The agents
engage in productive tasks that may be interdependent, in the sense that one agent’s
productive effort affects the output of his colleague. The principal can use this
productive interdependency, in combination with a sufficiently accurate accounting
information system, as an internal control mechanism that makes it more difficult
for the agents to shirk (i.e., collect information rents).
Productive interdependency is pervasive in organizations. For example, it is
virtually always present when individuals are organized in teams: in fact, it often
serves as the main reason to put the agents on a team so that shirking by one
member creates negative externalities for everyone. Productive interdependency
also occurs in other settings. Consider a factory where a purchasing manager may
be bribed by a supplier to accept components of inferior quality. Even though the
agreement between the manager and the supplier is not observable, the combination
of unfavorable direct-material quantity and direct-labor efficiency variances in the
manufacturing department (owing to additional scrap and rework) will point to the
likely cause of the problem. In a similar fashion, the actions of the production
manager will have a bearing on the outputs of his colleagues in other departments.
In this example, a technological link between the purchasing and manufacturing
departments provides information about the actions of both managers and thus
acts as a natural internal control.
In many cases, the degree of productive interdependency can be varied within
a certain range. In the example above, the principal who wishes to alter the ex-
tent to which the output of the production manager depends on the effort of the
purchasing manager can do so by, say, investing in a quality control system to con-
duct incoming inspection of components entering the manufacturing department.
In other cases, the properties of available technology will not allow the principal
to eliminate technological interdependency completely. And, in settings where no
natural interdependency exists, it may be introduced on purpose, which is precisely
the point of segregation of duties.
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The purpose of internal control is to reduce the negative consequences of infor-
mation asymmetry between the principal and the agents. From the standpoint of
consumers, the problem created by information asymmetry is that the expected level
of output (or, equivalently, productive effort) that is produced when the principal
hires the agents is lower than the the first-best level of output that obtains under
symmetric information. Productive efficiency, defined as the expected level of the
agents’ productive effort, provides a measure of how close the outputs attainable
under various organizational arrangements are to the first-best, or socially optimal,
level. In this chapter I show that, in the absence of implementation and reporting
costs, (1) when collusion between the agents is relatively easy, internal control that
increases productive efficiency decreases agency welfare, defined as the sum of the
principal’s and the agents’ payoffs; (2) when this is the case, the principal, under
certain conditions, prefers to use internal control as a threat instead of implementing
it; and (3) lowering the accuracy of the accounting information system may increase
the principal’s expected payoff.
The first result is brought about by the principal’s choice of productive efforts
required of the agents, which involves a trade-off between inefficiently low effort
levels and information rents. When the agents find it relatively easy to collude, the
effort levels required of them are such that agency welfare is lower with internal con-
trol than without, i.e., the agents’ loss from internal control exceeds the principal’s
gain. In other words, not implementing internal control creates a surplus, which,
under certain conditions, can be shared by the agents and the principal; hence the
second result. I will call the loss in agency welfare from implementing internal
control a structural cost, to distinguish it from implementation and reporting costs.
One would expect that the threat of collusion can diminish, and potentially
eliminate, the benefit from internal control. The model, however, demonstrates
that, when the principal is required (e.g., by SOX) to implement internal control,
collusion can actually cause her to sustain a loss relative to the benchmark case with
no internal control — even though internal control itself is costless and improves
productive efficiency. This result helps explain loud complaints by executives about
high compliance costs associated with internal control: anecdotal evidence suggests
that many companies that were required to implement internal control by regulations
(e.g., the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977) preceding SOX had simply not done
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so and now must incur both reporting and implementation costs. The model also
predicts that the principal may prefer to sever technological links that already exist,
thus providing an additional explanation for decisions to decentralize by granting
company divisions high levels of autonomy or spinning them off.
The third result is brought about by the crucial role of the accounting informa-
tion system in implementing internal control. If the principal is better off using it
only as a threat (and not implementing it) but available technology does not allow
her to eliminate productive interdependency completely, under certain conditions
she benefits from reducing the accuracy of the information system.
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
(COSO) gives the following definition of internal control:
Internal control is broadly defined as a process, effected by an entity’s board
of directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable
assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in the following categories:
• Effectiveness and efficiency of operations.
• Reliability of financial reporting.
• Compliance with applicable laws and regulations.3
The model developed in the paper can be interpreted either in terms of the first
type, often referred to as operational internal controls, or the second, also known as
controls over financial reporting. Indeed, productive units that are modeled in this
study can represent both individual employees and separate divisions that report
their financial results to the central office because, in this setting, the scale of pro-
duction is irrelevant. Although SOX and, to a large extent, the current discourse
on corporate governance have primarily focused on internal controls over financial
reporting, both types appear to be important — and are, to a great degree, inter-
linked. For this reason, the term “internal control” is used here to denote both. I
leave the explication of internal controls over compliance for future research.
3See COSO (1994, p. 13).
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2.1 Related Literature
The central trade-off in the model is between the benefits of internal control, which
makes it more difficult for the agents to shirk, and potential losses from collusion
that internal control induces. Organizational collusion has been studied extensively
in formal economic models. Tirole (1986, 1992) and Laffont and Tirole (1991) in-
vestigate a three-tier principal–supervisor–agent hierarchy where collusion takes the
form of an agreement between the supervisor and the agent to conceal information
about the agent’s type that is valuable to the principal. These authors show that,
absent contracting frictions (such as restrictions on contract types or costly com-
munication), collusion, both actual and potential, is harmful to the principal. For
the most part, the subsequent literature has followed the Laffont–Tirole tradition
and focused on settings where a supervising agent, who may or may not exert pro-
ductive or monitoring effort, observes some information about a productive agent
and may be paid by the latter to distort (usually, conceal) this information. The
general results are that a threat of collusion may reduce, but does not eliminate, the
benefits of supervision (Kofman and Lawarrée, 1993) and that a better supervision
technology increases welfare (Laffont, 2001, Proposition 2.3).
In the presence of contracting frictions, however, these results may no longer
hold. For example, in Laffont and Meleu (1997) two productive agents engage in
mutual monitoring and can enter a side-contract (i.e., collusive agreement) with
non-linear transaction costs. This property of their side-contract, in effect, imposes
a restriction on the set of admissible contracts available to the principal, who may, as
a result, find that increasing the quality of monitoring reduces her payoff. In Khalil
and Lawarrée (2006) the principal’s inability to commit to conducting a costly ex
post investigation may render the supervision by a collusive monitor useless.
Several studies demonstrate that, in some settings, collusion can actually have
a beneficial effect. Olsen and Torsvik (1998) show that the principal can benefit from
collusion between the supervisor and the agent because it alleviates the problem of
limited commitment. Chen (2003) demonstrates that collusion may be beneficial
for the principal because it introduces an incentive for the agents to communicate
their private information. In his model, the restriction on the type of admissible
contracts takes the form of sequential contracting: the principal has to make an
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investment decision before she contracts with the agent, whose private information
is pertinent to the decision. In Lawarrée and Shin (2005), the principal benefits when
she enriches the agents’ action space by allowing them to choose their productive
tasks and thus make a better use of their private information, even though by so
doing she, in effect, restricts her own action space.4 Papers demonstrating, in the
hidden information framework, that collusion may have beneficial effects when the
principal’s action or information space is restricted also include Che (1995), Strausz
(1997), and Shin (2006).
The focus in this chapter, however, is not on collusion per se but on internal
control, with collusion emerging as byproduct of implementing the latter as the
agents’ attempt to minimize its effect on their information rents. One of the two
potential benefits of internal control is that, with it in place, an agent cannot shirk
unilaterally: in order to collect his information rent he now has to collude with his
colleague. Collusion always reduces the agents’ expected information rent relative
to the benchmark case with no internal control and, in that sense, is beneficial to the
principal. But collusion also brings about the shortcoming of internal control. In the
models mentioned above the agent’s decision with respect to his effort is separable
from his decision to collude with the supervisor. In contrast, in this chapter, when
internal control is implemented, the agent’s decision with respect to effort level is
inseparable from his decision to collude. As a result, the principal’s response to the
threat of collusion involves requiring the agents to exert effort levels that reduce
agency welfare relative to the benchmark case.
Internal control provides a second benefit to the principal. Without it, she has
to know the types of both agents if she wants to extract their information rents. In
the presence of internal control she only has to know the type of one agent: she can
then deduce the type of his colleague by observing the output levels. If transfers
between the agents entail transaction costs, the principal can take advantage of this
useful property by choosing one agent and paying him the amount that is (weakly)
greater than what he can gain by colluding with the colleague.
The desirability of merging what otherwise would be independent operations
to make one agent’s compensation a function of the actions of his colleague was first
4Itoh (1993) obtains a similar result in a moral hazard setting.
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pointed out, in a different setting, by Demski and Sappington (1984), who propose
a direct revelation mechanism that is useful to the principal but is costly to operate.
Ma, Moore, and Turnbull (1988) show that the principal can do better by offering
the agents an indirect mechanism that gives one of the agents a choice of additional
output levels: by choosing one of these levels, the agent communicates informa-
tion about his colleague to the principal (or, in other words, turns his colleague
in). The mechanism is further refined by Glover (1994) who demonstrates that, by
offering just one additional output level that can be used to communicate private
information, the principal can approximate the second-best solution.
The desirability, from the principal’s standpoint, of implementing internal con-
trol is thus a function of the magnitude of the above-mentioned cost and benefits,
as well as the principal’s ability to share with the agents the surplus that obtains
when internal control is not implemented and the costs of collusion are relatively
low. Under certain conditions that are often observed in practice, such as sequential
contracting with the agents, the principal is, indeed able to extract the surplus and
as a result obtains a higher expected payoff when internal control is not implemented
than when it is. It should be noted here that, unlike the two benefits, the loss in
agency welfare is discontinuous at zero. In that sense, it behaves very much like a
fixed cost: the principal incurs it the moment she “switches on” internal control.
As its intensity increases, so does the benefit from reducing the agents’ information
rent, until the benefit is just equal to the cost. Only when the intensity of internal
control is above this “break-even” value is the principal’s payoff increased when she
implements it.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The model is introduced in Section 2.2. In
Section 2.3, I solve the model and characterize the principal’s decision to implement
internal control. Her choice of the accounting information system is discussed in
Section 2.4; Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
Consider a firm composed of three risk-neutral parties: a principal and two agents,
labeled A and B. The principal owns the firm but does not possess the requisite
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expertise to operate it, while the agents are capable of operating the firm but lack
financial resources to buy it from the principal. I assume that the principal cannot
assign one of the agents to perform both tasks. Agent i exerts effort ei > 0 at a





, i = A,B. Agents’ efforts determine outputs produced by their




xA(eA, eB) = θA + (1 − α) eA + αeB ,
xB(eA, eB) = θB + αeA + (1 − α) eB ,
(2.1)
where θi is the efficiency parameter that characterizes the “fit” between agent i and
the division that he operates and is not known to him ex ante. For example, when
an executive from Boeing Co. is appointed as the CEO of Ford Motor Co., his past
success at the former company does not guarantee adequate performance at the
latter. Parameters θi can take one of two values, θl and θh, with ∆θ = θh − θl > 0.
It is common knowledge that, with probability ν (resp., 1 − ν), agent i is efficient
(resp., inefficient) in the sense that his productivity parameter θi is equal to θh
(resp., θl). I assume that 0 < ν < 1. Agent i’s effort and efficiency parameter are
his private information.
Only the agents observe the output given by (2.1); the principal observes a
verifiable report, r (x) ∈ R2, generated by the company’s accounting system.6 For
simplicity, assume that the report function r: R2+ 7→ R2+ admits the following rep-




. The accuracy of the accounting system is




‖x − r (x) ‖,
where X ⊂ R2+ is the set of all possible realizations of output x. In most of the
5This can be seen as a special case of a more general production function given by
x




B(eA, eB) = θB + α21e
A + α22e
B.
Setting α11 = α22 and α12 = α21 simplifies the exposition considerably without changing the
qualitative nature of the results. The normalization α11 = 1 − α21 ≡ 1 − α is adopted to facilitate
comparisons across various regimes. Very similar results obtain with three agents.




, using boldface letters
to represent (row) vectors.
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chapter I assume that the principal has at her disposal an accounting system char-
acterized by a perfect reporting function (i.e., the one with m(r) = 0); the case of a
positive margin of error is considered in Section 2.4.
Production function (2.1) can be interpreted as a stylized model of segregation
of duties, where the principal’s goal is to make sure that no process or transaction is
carried out by a single agent. The principal attains this goal by setting α > 0. The
above formulation also captures the effect of positive externalities that often exist
across divisions and firms. For example, high-quality blueprints produced by a de-
sign engineer make the production engineer’s job easier, and a qualified production
engineer may be able to spot the designer’s errors and expedite the process of cor-
recting them. It is likely that in real-life situations the agent’s expertise, represented
by the efficiency parameter θ, will have a stronger effect on the productivity of his
own division than on that of his colleague’s. Production function (2.1) captures this
fact in the simplest possible manner by focusing on the case where the output of a
given division is only affected by the efficiency parameter of the agent operating it.
One would also expect that the effect of an agent’s effort on the productivity of his
division would be greater than its effect on the division operated by another agent;
assuming otherwise would beg a question of why he was not assigned to the other
division in the first place. In terms of the model, this means that α < 1
2
.
The limiting case α = 0 corresponds to a setting where both divisions are
independent and thus the output of agent i is uninformative about the effort of agent
j, i 6= j. On the other hand, when 0 < α < 1
2
, each of the two outputs provides
information about both agents’ efforts. In effect, the agents are now organized
in a team: if either of them wants to collect information rent, he has to ensure
cooperation of (i.e., collusion with) his colleague to do so. That is, the principal can
use technological interdependency as an internal control that allows her to increase
her expected payoff by (i) making sure that the agents have to collude if they want
to shirk, and (ii) making collusion costlier for the agents. Indeed, an increase in α
increases the agents’ cost of collusion and makes it easier for the principal to prevent
it. It is, therefore, natural to interpret α as a measure of intensity of internal control,
with α = 0 corresponding to the case of no internal control.
Owing to available technology, the principal may only be able to change the
degree of productive interdependency within a certain range. Sometimes, as in
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the example with a purchasing manager on p. 7, by increasing the accuracy of the
incoming inspection the principal can change α continuously. In other cases, as in
the example with design and production engineers, she may not be able to alter it
at all. To capture this possibility, I make the following assumption about the upper
(α) and lower (α) bounds on α that are given exogenously:7
Assumption 1. α ∈ [α,α ] , where 0 6 α 6 α < 1
2
and α = α⇒ α > 0 .
The principal chooses the intensity of internal control, α, and the accuracy
of the accounting information system, r(·). Under the standard assumption that
prices of the outputs are normalized to unity so that xA and xB represent both
outputs and revenues, the principal’s payoff is equal to the sum of the outputs net
of monetary transfers, ti, to the agents and is given by
Π(eA, eB) = xA(eA, eB) + xB(eA, eB) − tA(r(x)) − tB(r(x))
= θA + θB + eA + eB − tA(r(x)) − tB(r(x)) .
Under complete information, the principal requires both agents to exert the first-
best effort levels of eAfb = e
B
fb = 1 and sets the transfers t
i such that the agents receive
their reservation utility levels, which are normalized to zero. Under the first-best
allocation, the agents’ combined expected information rent, Rfb, is zero and agency
welfare, W ≡ R+ Π, is given by
Wfb = Πfb = 1 + 2 (θl + ν∆θ) .
Following the tradition established in the literature on collusion, I assume that
the agents can enter into a binding side contract that may be supported, for example,
by a mechanism that makes such contract self-enforcing. I also assume that side
transfers between the agents may involve transaction costs, i.e., the agents can
make side transfers at a rate of 1
1+δ
, δ > 0.8 It is worth noting that, in this setting,
transfers do not have to take monetary form: since both agents are productive, one
7The requirement that α 6= 1
2
guarantees that simultaneous equations (2.1) have a non-
degenerate solution; it is similar to Condition (C.2) in Ma (1988). The requirement that
α = α ⇒ α > 0 rules out the uninteresting case where internal control is impossible. Other-
wise, Assumption 1 is just a labeling convention and, as such, is made without loss of generality.
8The reader is referred to Tirole (1992) for an extended discussion of both assumptions.
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can simply work in the other’s division. The case of δ > 0 then corresponds to a
situation where, e.g., an agent is not as efficient working in his colleague’s division
as in his own.
Since the agents bargain over their collusive agreement under asymmetric in-
formation, the principal may be able to exploit the frictions in side contracting to
make collusion more difficult. For example, Felli (1990) shows that, when each of the
agents can renege on the side contract before he starts executing it, the principal can
rule out collusion altogether at no cost. It is, however, very unlikely that, in real-life
settings, the principal will be able to interfere in the mutual dealings between the
agents to the extent sufficient to disrupt their collusive agreement. Following the
path taken by most of collusion literature (and explicated in Tirole, 1992), I will
take the “black-box” approach to side contracting and assume that, whenever the
agents can benefit from collusion, they find a way to enter into a binding agree-
ment so as to take advantage of the information asymmetry.9 Since neither of the
agents can collect an information rent unilaterally, I will also assume that they have
equal bargaining power and thus share the proceeds from their collusive agreement
equally. The allocations derived under this assumption thus characterize the lower
bound of the principal’s expected payoff and provide conservative estimates of the
value of internal control.
The timing of the game is as follows:
0. The principal chooses α and r(·) that will be implemented.
1. Nature chooses the type of each agent. Each agent learns only his type.
2. The principal, who has all bargaining power, offers to the agents a grand
contract specifying, for each agent, the action that should be taken and the
corresponding compensation.
3. Each agent accepts or refuses the grand contract. If at least one agent
refuses, the game ends and all parties receive their reservation utilities.
4. The agents negotiate over the side contract.
9An alternative approach is taken by Laffont and Martimort (1997), who assume that the side
contract is designed by an uninformed third party, which is interpreted as a modeling device. A
third party also appears in Laffont and Martimort (1998), where it is used to characterize the
allocation in a centralized setting, and in Laffont and Martimort (2000) in a model of the provision
of public goods.
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5. Each agent accepts or refuses the side contract. If at least one agent refuses,
the grand contract is played noncooperatively.
6. If the side contract has been accepted by both agents, the reports to the
principal and transfers specified by the side contract are made.
7. The agents simultaneously produce their outputs and the transfers are ex-
ecuted according to the grand contract.




, where φ(·) is
the manipulation of the report sent to the principal, yij(·) are the transfers made
from agent i to agent j, where i, j = A,B, i 6= j, and ẽi are the efforts supplied by
agent i under the side contract. As shown by Tirole (1992), the Collusion-Proofness
Principle (which is a version of the Revelation Principle) applies in this setting, and
any final allocation that can be achieved by the side contract can also be achieved by
the principal; hence the model can be represented by a direct mechanism in which
the principal offers collusion-proof grand contracts. As a result, there is no collusion
in equilibrium. I am interested in characterizing perfect Bayesian equilibria of the
game in pure strategies.
I assume that at stage 1, when the principal makes a decision whether or not
to implement internal controls, she can sign a binding agreement with the agents
with respect to this decision only. That is, the agents negotiate with the principal
in two stages, with the grand contract specifying effort levels and transfers being
signed at stage 3. Sequential contracting of this sort, where decisions with respect to
organizational structure and agents compensation are made at different times, are
often observed in practice. For example, many contracts for lower-level employees
stipulate a trial period that may range from several weeks to several years. The usual
explanation is that in the course of the trial period employees have an opportunity to
better learn the job; in terms of the model, it is during this period that the employee
learns his type. It is also not uncommon for employment contracts with higher-level
employees, such as top executives, to be negotiated over prolonged periods of time,
with several stages of offers and counteroffers. Commitments made at earlier stages
are then supported by reputation concerns.
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2.3 Characterization
2.3.1 Benchmark Case: No Internal Control
As a benchmark, consider the case with no internal control (i.e., with α = 0) where
the principal faces two agents whose outputs are independent. Each agent, when he
is efficient, can collect his information rent without interacting with his colleague,
hence there is no scope for collusion. In this section, I assume that the principal
has access to a perfect accounting information system (i.e., that m(r) = 0). In
the absence of side contract, the Revelation Principle applies and, without loss
of generality, the grand contract can be represented by a direct mechanism that
specifies effort levels ek and transfers tk, where k = h, l, required of each of the agents
when his efficiency parameter is θh and θl respectively. Since the principal observes
the outputs but not the realizations of the efficiency parameters, the efficient agent
can produce the output required of his inefficient colleague at a lower cost by exerting





(e− ∆θ)2 > 0.
That is, Φ(el) denotes the amount of information rent collected by the efficient agent
when he claims to be inefficient.
It is also convenient to introduce the following notation:
Uh = th − 12 (eh)
2 ,
Ul = tl − 12 (el)
2 .
With this notation, one can write the incentive compatibility constraints as follows:
Uh > Ul + Φ(el), (2.2)
Ul > Uh − Φ(eh + ∆θ). (2.3)
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The participation constraints take the following form:
Uh > 0, (2.4)
Ul > 0. (2.5)
It is easy to check that only the incentive compatibility constraint for the efficient
agent (2.2) and the participation constraint for the inefficient agent (2.5) are binding
at the optimum. Substituting the binding constraints in the principal’s objective
function, one can write the principal’s maximization problem as follows (the sub-





θh + eh − 12 (eh)
2 − Φ (el)
)
+ (1 − ν)
(




Notice that the effort level required of the inefficient agent, el, determines the
amount of information rent collected by the efficient agent. Since this amount is
increasing in el and the cost function is convex, the principal benefits from reducing
el below the first-best level. At the optimum, her loss in productivity from an
inefficiently low level of el just equals her benefit from reducing the efficient agent’s
information rent. Maximizing (2.6) with respect to the agents’ effort levels yields
the following solution:
eh = 1 = efb ,
el = 1 − ∆θ
ν
1 − ν .
(2.7)
That is, an efficient agent exerts the first-best level of effort and collects his infor-
mation rent, regardless of the type or actions of his colleague: there is no scope for
collusion. An inefficient agent exerts effort that is strictly lower than the first-best
and collects no information rent.
In what follows I assume that el > 0, i.e., shutdown is never optimal and the
principal employs agents of both types (the necessary conditions are stated formally
in Assumption 2). It is straightforward to show that productive efficiency ENC ,
the principal’s expected payoff ΠNC , the agents’ information rent RNC , and agency
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welfare WNC under this contract are given by
ENC = 2 (1 − ν∆θ) , (2.8)
ΠNC = 1 + 2θl + (∆θ)
2 ν
1 − ν , (2.9)
RNC = ∆θν
(




WNC = 1 + 2θl + 2ν∆θ − (∆θ)2
ν2
1 − ν , (2.11)
where the subscripts stand for no control.





θh + eh − 12(eh)
2
)
+ (1 − ν)
(







Expected agency welfare10 Expected
information rent
A social utility maximizer putting equal weights on all parties’ expected payoffs
would ignore the distribution of information rents between the principal and two
agents (viewed as a group) and maximize expected agency welfare only. In this
case, asymmetric information would have no effect on the output level because the
first-best levels of effort would be chosen. In contrast, the principal maximizes her
expected payoff — and, therefore, is willing to accept some downward distortion
away from the socially efficient effort level in order to decrease the agent’s expected
information rent. As a consequence, under asymmetric information both productive
efficiency and agency welfare — the two measures that characterize the resultant
allocation — are below the corresponding socially efficient levels.
The above-mentioned measures capture different properties of the principal–
agent relationship. Productive efficiency, E, measures the expected level of output
but ignores the cost of producing it. In settings with asymmetric information, con-
sumers suffer from underproduction and thus benefit from any increase in productive
efficiency. The important limitation of this measure, however, is that the model, set
in a partial equilibrium framework, is silent about the value that consumers derive
10Some authors use the term allocative efficiency : see, e.g., Laffont and Martimort (2002).
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from this increase. On the other hand, agency welfare, W , accounts for expected
output net of the technological cost and, therefore, characterizes the social value of
the contractual relationship.
2.3.2 The Case with Internal Control
Consider now the case where the principal uses internal control (i.e., α > 0). Since
output x is now a function of the efforts supplied by both agents, neither of them
can collect any information rent unless they coordinate their efforts. For some
realizations of the efficiency parameters, the agents may benefit only if they can
also make transfers. Thus in a setting where collusion is impossible — i.e., the
agents can neither effect transfers nor communicate with each other — the principal
offers the agents a grand contact (which I label C0) specifying, for all possible
realizations of the efficiency parameters, the first-best effort levels and transfers
that just compensate the agents for their efforts, with penalties for any realization
of the output x not prescribed by the contract.
It is easy to see, however, that this contract is not incentive compatible if the
agents can collude (I consider the case with no collusion in Chapter 3). A collusion-
proof grand contract, therefore, has to guarantee the agents the payoffs at least as
high as the ones that they would collect if they were to collude. The grand contract,
which I label C1, specifies effort levels and transfers for each of the four possible










, where the subscripts j, k = l, h denote
the types of agents A and B respectively. To provide a benchmark setting where
the organization has a “flat” (as opposed to hierarchical) organizational structure, I
will assume in this section that the principal offers a grand contract that is symmet-
ric with respect to the agents’ identities. This assumption can also be interpreted
as representing cultural or institutional constraints: for example, in government
agencies and many European organizations (notably, universities) there exist se-
vere restrictions on the maximum pay difference for employees occupying identical
positions. This assumption will be relaxed in Chapters 3 and 4.
As a practical matter, the symmetry of the grand contract allows me to simplify















I use double indices to denote the case with internal control and single indices —
the case with no internal control.
Since the reports to the principal are made after the agents enter the side
contract and learn each other’s types, the agents’ participation and incentive com-
patibility constraints have to be satisfied for each possible realization of the efficiency
parameters. The participation constraints are given by
tjk − 12 (ejk)
2 > 0 , (2.12)
where j, k = h, l.
With α > 0, incentive compatibility constraints take different forms depending
on the parameters of the model and the realization of the agents’ types. First,
consider the case where both agents are efficient: I will call it the hh-case since both
productivity parameters take their high values. Production function (2.1) allows the









h ) = (θl, θl), y
AB = yBA = 0, ẽA = ẽB = ell
}
.
That is, both agents exert effort of ell and there are no transfers. The grand contract,
therefore, has to satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraint:
thh − 12 (ehh)
2 > tll − 12 (ell)
2 + Φ (ell) . (2.13)
Consider now the case where only one agent, i, is efficient: in this chapter,
I will call it the hl-case regardless of the identity of agent i. If agent i claims to
11As we shall see presently, in a generic case ell 6= el and thus Φ (ell) 6= Φ(el).
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be inefficient and decreases his level of effort by ∆θ, the output of division j will
decrease by α∆θ, giving away the deviation and the identity of its perpetrator.
Agent i, however, can ask his colleague to exert additional effort to make up for
this deficiency and compensate him for the inconvenience. If the level of productive
interdependency α is sufficiently small, the machination will be profitable — albeit
less so than in the hh-case. Since, for the deviation to remain undetected by the
principal the levels of output under this collusive agreement should be the same as
in the ll-case, the new effort levels, êi and êj , must satisfy the following conditions:
∆θ + (1 − α)êi + αêj = ell ,
αêi + (1 − α)êj = ell ,
(2.14)
where i, j = A,B and i 6= j. The solution to (2.14) is given by
êi = ell − ∆θ
1 − α
1 − 2α ,
êj = ell + ∆θ
α






















Here, Ψ(·) denotes cost savings for the efficient agent in the hl-case when he claims
to be inefficient and ψ(·) denotes additional cost incurred by the inefficient agent
for which he has to be compensated. To simplify the analysis, I make the following
assumption:12
Assumption 2. If α = 0, then el − ∆θ > 0. If α > 0, then ell − ∆θ
1 − α
1 − 2α > 0.
Under the side contract, the agents share the proceeds from their collusive
action equally. Thus, with transaction cost δ > 0, the transfer from the efficient
12This assumption can be relaxed at the expense of introducing additional nonnegativity condi-
tions in the appropriate incentive compatibility constraints. Doing so complicates the computation
without changing the qualitative nature of the results.
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agent i to his colleague, yij, has to satisfy the following condition:
Ψ(ell) − yij =
1
1 + δ
yij − ψ(ell). (2.16)
Solving (2.16) for yij , we find that yij = 1+δ
2+δ
(Ψ(ell) + ψ(ell)) and the information
rent collected by each agent when they collude is given by 1
2+δ
(Ψ(ell) − (1 + δ)ψ(ell)).
It is convenient to introduce the following notation:
R(·) ≡ Ψ(·) − (1 + δ)ψ(·). (2.17)
Clearly, the agents will not engage in collusion in the hl-case if they are worse off
as a result. Therefore, the side contract has to satisfy the following acceptance
constraint:
R(ell) > 0. (2.18)
The side contract will take one of two different forms, depending on the values of
the parameters. When the cost of collusion, as determined by α and δ, is sufficiently
low so that constraint (2.18) is not binding, collusion occurs in both hh- and hl-
cases, i.e., whenever at least one of the agents is efficient; I will call the corresponding
set of parameters the full collusion (FC) region. Since my goal is to characterize
the lower bound of the principal’s payoff attainable under various organizational
arrangements, I will in what follows focus primarily on this region of parameters.








(Ψ(ell) + ψ(ell)) , y
ji = 0, ẽi = êi, ẽj = êj
}
,
where êi, êj are given by (2.15). The grand contract, therefore, has to satisfy the

























When the cost of collusion is sufficiently high and constraint (2.18) is binding,
the agents collude only in the hh-case. I will call the corresponding set of parameters
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the partial collusion (PC) region. Figure 2.1 shows that, for intermediate values
of probability ν, the full collusion region becomes smaller as transaction cost δ
increases. In the partial collusion region, there is no profitable deviation for the
agents in the hl-case and, by the standard assumption that, when indifferent, the
agents act in the best interest of the principal, the side contract specifies truthful
reports and zero transfers:
{
φ(θ̂i, θ̂j) = (θi, θj), yij = yji = 0, ẽi = ei, ẽj = ej
}
.
The incentive compatibility constraints in the grand contract then take the following
form:
thl − 12 (ehl)
2 > tll − 12 (ell)
2 ,
tlh − 12 (elh)
2 > tll − 12 (ell)
2 .












Figure 2.1: Two regions in δ–α space; α0 solves (2.18) written
with equality.
Consider now the agents’ decisions to accept the side contract at stage 5 when
each of them only knows his own type. From the discussion above it is clear that
the efficient agent always strictly prefers to enter the side contract — but, in the
partial collusion region, the inefficient agent is indifferent between entering into
a collusive agreement and signing the grand contract with the principal directly.
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Notice, however, that in this case both agents collect zero information rents and the
principal does not benefit by using this indifference to extract the information from
the inefficient agent. On the other hand, in the full collusion region both agents
strictly prefer to enter the side contract. It is, therefore, without loss of generality
to assume that the agents always accept the side contract.
2.3.3 Results
The principal’s problem is to choose ejk and tjk, where j, k = h, l, so as to maximize
ΠC1 = 2ν
2 (θh + ehh − thh)
+ 2ν (1 − ν) (θh + θl + ehl − thl + elh − tlh)
+ 2 (1 − ν)2 (θl + ell − tll)
subject to (2.12), (2.13), (2.18), (2.19) and (2.20).
(2.21)
The solution to (2.21) is given in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Under the optimal collusion-proof contract with internal control, C1:
1. The effort levels are given by:
ehh = ehl = elh = 1 = efb ;
(a) In the full collusion (FC) region:




1 − δ 1 − ν
(2 + δ)(1 − 2α)
}
;
(b) In the partial collusion (PC) region:
ell = 1 − ∆θ
ν2
(1 − ν)2 .
2. The full collusion region is characterized by α 6 α0, where
α0 =
(4 + δ)(1 − ν)2 − ∆θ
(







4(1 − ν)2 − ∆θ
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(4 + δ)(1 − ν)2 − ∆θ
(
1 + 2ν(1 + δ) + ν2(1 − δ)
))2
− (2 + δ)
(
(2 − ∆θ)(1 + ν2) − 4ν
) (








Under the contract with no internal control (NC) the principal trades off her
benefit from reducing the information rent accruing to the efficient agents against
the loss from setting the efforts required of the inefficient agents below the first-best
level. When the principal implements internal control, she requires the first-best
effort of both agents not only in the hh-case, which occurs with probability ν2,
but, in addition, in the hl-case, which occurs with probability 2ν(1 − ν). That is,
lowering ell reduces information rents in both of these cases and requires inefficiently
low effort levels of both agents only in the ll-case, which occurs with probability
(1 − ν)2. One would, therefore, expect the principal to be better off when she
implements internal control. The following result demonstrates that this conjecture
is correct — but, under certain conditions, she can do even better by offering the
agents a different contract.
Proposition 1. The allocations attainable under the contract with no internal con-
trol (NC) and the contract with internal control (C1) have the following properties:
1. With respect to productive efficiency:
(a) In the FC region: EFCC1 −ENC > 0, with strict inequality for δ > 0 ;
(b) In the PC region: EPCC1 − ENC > 0.
2. With respect to the principal’s expected payoff: ΠC1 − ΠNC > 0.
3. With respect to agency welfare:
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According to Proposition 1, internal control (weakly) improves productive effi-
ciency and, under the contract C1 described on pp. 21 – 24, the principal is strictly
better off implementing it. In fact, the following result holds:





In other words, whenever the agents find it relatively easy to collude and the
principal chooses to implement internal control (i.e., in the full collusion region)
she always prefers to increase its intensity to the maximum level, α, allowed by the
available technology. Notice that there is no benefit for the principal in increasing
the intensity of internal control beyond α0 since her expected payoff in the partial
collusion region does not depend on α. If, however, α is not too high and collusion is
relatively costly to prevent, implementing internal control decreases agency welfare.
The result highlights the difficulty faced by the regulator: implementing internal
control always benefits one group of a company’s stakeholders — consumers — by
increasing productive efficiency (provided δ > 0) but sometimes is harmful for two
other important groups, shareholders and employees, because it decreases the sum
of profits accruing to these two groups.
The loss in agency welfare given by WNC −WC1 represents a structural cost,
which obtains even in the absence of implementation and reporting costs. However,
as collusion becomes costlier for the agents — and, in particular, as the intensity of
internal control increases — so does agency welfare: see Figure 2.2).
It follows from Proposition 1 that, when agency welfare is lower with internal
control than without (i.e., WC1 < WNC), the agents’ loss from internal control
exceeds the principal’s gain. The principal thus can increase her expected payoff
relative to the contract C1 if she can extract from the agents the surplus that obtains










Figure 2.2: The effect of internal control on productive efficiency
E and agency welfare W in the FC region with δ > 0.
The value of α⋆ is given in Proposition 1.
in the Appendix, the agents’ expected information rent is always strictly less with
internal control than without, i.e., RNC > RC1 . Therefore, at stage 1 when the
principal makes a decision with respect to internal control and the agents have not
yet learned their types, each of them is willing to pay the principal up to the amount
of 1
2
(RNC − RC1) > 0 — or, equivalently, agree to make salary concession in the
same amount at stage 3 when they negotiate over the grand contract — if she does
not implement internal control. When WC1 < WNC (i.e., when α < α
⋆: see Figure
2.3), the principal prefers to accept their offer, provided the agents’ commitment
is credible. I will label this new contract C2. The result that obtains when the
















is given in Proposition 1.
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Proposition 2. When internal control decreases agency welfare, the principal’s
expected payoff is higher under contract C2 than under contract C1. That is,
WNC > WC1 ⇒ ΠC2 > ΠC1 .
Proof. See Appendix.
In other words, the ability to implement internal control is always valuable to
the principal, but the decision to actually implement it depends on transaction costs,
the properties of available technology, and the characteristics of feasible contractual
arrangements. In particular, the easier it is for the agents to enter into a collusive
agreement, the less likely is the principal to implement internal control.
It can also be shown that, as ν increases, the principal is more likely to find




contract C2, or in the partial collusion (PC) region, where for sufficiently high
values of ν she also offers contract C2. That is, the more likely it is that an agent
is efficient, the less likely is the principal to use internal control. Situations with
relatively high values of ν will be observed, e.g., when there exists an effective but
imperfect mechanism of screening the agents for high productivity.
To summarize, implementing internal control has markedly different conse-
quences for shareholders and managers depending on the technological and organi-
zational characteristics of the firm and the pool of job candidates. In particular, the
results demonstrate that company characteristics other than size can have a direct
bearing on the type of internal controls that best serves the interests of shareholders.
The proximity to the operations allows external and (especially) internal auditors
to evaluate these characteristics and attest to the adequacy of the internal control
system. The attestation process, however, turns out to be more involved than ini-
tially envisioned by the regulators, and the precipitous rise in audit fees reported in
recent years may, indeed, be commensurate with the increase in audit costs.
The results reported in this chapter also demonstrate that requiring companies
to implement internal control (e.g., by regulation) provides them with incentives to
reduce implementation costs but has very limited effect, if at all, on the magnitude
of structural costs that stem from the organizational arrangement and informational
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structure. In fact, to the extent that better information technology facilitates side
contracting and reduces transaction costs δ, the number of companies that prefer
not to implement internal control may actually increase over time.
2.4 The Role of Accounting Information System
Consider now the case where WNC −WFCC1 (α) > 0 and α > 0, i.e., the principal
prefers not to implement internal control but available technology does not allow her
to get rid of productive interdependency completely. The agents will only agree to
make salary concessions and sign contract C2 if she can credibly commit to ignore all
information provided by the internal control system. Specifically, when she observes
xi = θl + 1 − ∆θ
ν
1 − ν ± α∆θ,
the levels of output in the hl-case when the efficient agent claims to be inefficient,
she has to act as if she has observed
xi = θl + 1 − ∆θ
ν
1 − ν ,
the level of output in the ll-case when both agents exert the level of effort given
by (2.7). If commitment of this sort cannot be made, the agents will collude and
the principal’s expected payoff will be ΠC1 . Under certain conditions, however, she
may be able to overcome the lack-of-commitment problem and strictly increase her
expected payoff by decreasing the accuracy of the accounting information system,
as the following result demonstrates.
Proposition 3. There exists a set of parameters with non-empty interior and re-
porting functions r0, r1 such that m(r1) > m(r0) and Π(r1) > Π(r0).
Proof. See Appendix.
Here, again, the principal uses her ability to install a more accurate information
system as a threat in negotiating with the agents but in fact installs a less accurate
one. Notice that reducing the accuracy of the information system predictably leads
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to a loss in productive efficiency because the effort level required of the agents when
both of them are inefficient is lower than the corresponding effort level in the bench-
mark case. The result has implications for the problem of establishing materiality
thresholds in financial reporting. In the Statement of Financial Accounting Con-
cepts No. 2, FASB argues that the degree of precision of the accounting information
system is a factor in materiality judgments (FASB, 1980, §130). In this model, the
degree of precision (i.e., the margin of error) is determined endogenously.
It follows immediately from Proposition 3 that, if a more accurate information
system is not available, the principal will be willing to invest up to the amount
given by (A.9) in the Appendix in a more accurate system that will only be used as
a threat and never actually installed. This investment is a deadweight loss because
it does not improve productive efficiency (the effort levels are the same under both
systems) and is only used to redistribute the agents’ information rent.
Proposition 3 is related to the result reported in Arya, Glover, and Sunder
(1998), who show, in a moral hazard framework, that an accounting information
system with earnings management may help the principal overcome the lack-of-
commitment problem by delaying her decision to fire an under-performing agent
and thereby providing him with a stronger ex ante incentive to work hard. One
difference, aside from the setting, between the model by these authors and the
one studied here concerns the properties of the accounting information system in
question. In Arya et al. (1998), in the managed earnings setting the information
system aggregates earnings over two periods: the principal observes the sum of the
two earnings figures at the end of the second period. That is, information is delayed
but none of it is lost. In contrast, in my model the information system distorts (or
garbles) the output figures and some information is lost as a result.
2.5 Discussion
All internal controls share the property that, when implemented, they create a
scope for collusion between (or among) the agents. In this chapter I investigate a
model where the agents do not abuse internal control for personal gains but may
collude to mitigate its effect on their ability to shirk. Internal control studied in this
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chapter provides two potential benefits to the principal: (i) it forces the agents to
collude if they want to collect information rents and thereby reduces their benefit
from shirking and (ii) it serves as an additional source of information about their
effort levels. As a result, internal control makes is easier for the principal to reduce
the agents’ information rents. However, it also comes at a cost of reducing agency
welfare (I call it structural cost) that does not disappear even when internal control
is costless to implement. When collusion is relatively easy (and, therefore, difficult
to prevent), this cost outweighs both of the above-mentioned benefits.
Under certain conditions, the principal is able to extract from the agents the
surplus that obtains when internal control is not implemented and increase her
expected payoff relative to the case with internal control. That is, internal control
is always valuable to the principal — but she sometimes prefers to use it as a threat
without actually implementing it. The model demonstrates that, the easier it is for
the agents to collude, the less likely is the principal to implement internal control,
provided that the credible commitment by the agents is possible. I also show that
the principal may benefit from reducing the accuracy of the accounting information
system. This chapter provides a natural setting where the problem of the principal’s
inability to commit to ignore the information provided by the internal control system
can be remedied by reducing its accuracy.
In this chapter I focus on a centralized setting where the agents can sign bind-
ing collusive agreements — i.e., there are no frictions in side contracting. From a
methodological standpoint, the “black-box” approach to modeling the agents’ nego-
tiation over the side contract can be seen as a reduced form of a more comprehensive
model where the bargaining over the side contract is studied explicitly. As a result,
the model characterizes the upper bound of the agents’ (collective) gain from col-
lusion (corresponding to the lower bound of the value of internal control to the
principal) and is consistent with the approach typically taken in the collusion lit-
erature (see, e.g., Laffont and Martimort, 1998). The pervasive nature of collusion
in organizations is a well-documented phenomenon (see, e.g., Tirole, 1986); hence
the natural question to ask is, what can be done to minimize its detrimental effect?
I investigate several avenues that the principal can pursue in response to the threat





As shown in Chapter 2, the value of internal control to the principal depends on
transaction costs of collusion, δ, which determine how easy it is for the agents
to exchange transfers. One interpretation of transaction costs is that each agent
simply finds it easier to work in his department than in his colleague’s. Following
Tirole (1992), one can also interpret transaction costs as a reduced form of modeling
frictions in side contracting. A more literal interpretation that monetary transfers
are infeasible and “in-kind” transfers entail losses is also consistent with the model.
In this chapter, I investigate side contracting in more detail by explicitly con-
sidering the role that communication between the agents plays in making collusion
feasible. In Chapter 2, side contracting between the agents was frictionless, hence
the resultant allocation characterized the upper bound of the principal’s loss from
collusion. To determine the sensitivity of internal control to individual components
of side contracting, in section 3.1, I consider the (benchmark) case where communi-
cation between the agents is infinitely costly, ruling out collusion altogether. I show
that, for a wide range of parameters, the principal in this case attains the first-best
allocation. I then discuss the extent to which the principal can take advantage of
internal control in real-life settings where the cost of communication between the
agents takes intermediate values.
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In Section 3.2, I focus on one avenue of increasing the value of internal control
available to the principal: the choice of an organizational arrangement. I relax the
assumption adopted in Chapter 2 that the contracts offered to the agents are sym-
metric and show that the principal benefits from treating the agents asymmetrically,
but only if δ > 0. I then discuss the implications of using transaction costs as a
shortcut to modeling contracting frictions. In Section 3.3 I investigate the properties
of production function (2.1) and the extent to which the results are sensitive to its
properties. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.1 The Cost of Horizontal Communication
Thus far, I have considered the settings where transfers between the agents are
subject to (exogenous) transaction costs δ > 0, which, inter alia, represent the fric-
tions in side contracting, but communication between the agents is costless. This
approach is standard in models of collusion (see, e.g., Laffont and Meleu, 1997) and
can be justified by appealing to practice where it usually is easier for the agents
to communicate with one another than with the principal but the principal has an
advantage in effecting transfers. The assumption that horizontal communication
is costless can then be seen as simply a convenient normalization. It has, how-
ever, been shown in the literature (see, e.g., Laffont and Martimort, 1998) that
the allocations attainable under the threat of collusion are sensitive to the type of
communication mechanism available to the agents. In this section, I investigate the
effect of horizontal communication on the value of internal control.
The frictions in communication between employees can take various forms,
from literal misunderstanding when, say, both speak English as a second language, to
inability to convey information, such as the details of the contract with the principal,
in a credible way. Even though in most real-life settings the costs of communication
fall somewhere on the continuum between zero and infinity, considering the extreme
case of no communication suffices to characterize the effect of these costs on internal
control. It should be noted, however, that the principal will usually have a limited
ability to change these costs. Furthermore, it can be argued that internal control is
effective in limiting the agents’ ability to engage in inappropriate behavior precisely
because they are in a better position to control — and hence communicate with —
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each other than the principal. Nonetheless, considering the case where the lack
of horizontal communication rules out collusion altogether is instructive because
it provides a useful, if rarely attainable in practice, benchmark that characterizes
the upper bound of the value of internal control. Consistent with this goal, in this
section I will confine attention to identifying conditions that allow the principal to
implement the first-best allocation.
Consider the following version of the model introduced in Chapter 2.
0. The principal implements α > 0.
1. Nature chooses the type of each agent. Each agent learns only his type.
2. The principal offers to the agents a contract specifying, for each agent, the
action that should be taken and the corresponding compensation.
3. Each agent accepts or refuses the grand contract. If at least one agent
refuses, the game ends and all parties receive their reservation utilities.
4. If both agents have accepted the contract, each submits to the principal
his report, without observing the report submitted by the other agent.
5. The agents simultaneously produce their outputs and the transfers are ex-
ecuted.
Since the agents cannot communicate, they also cannot exchange transfers, and thus
a feasible deviation from the effort levels specified in the contract is only possible
in the hh-case (recall from Chapter 2 that when only one of the agents is efficient,
a deviation by either of them will be detected unless they coordinate efforts and
exchange transfers). When both agents deviate and collect information rents, we
observe what is known as tacit collusion (see, e.g., Mookherjee, 1984, and Arya,
Glover, and Hughes, 1997) because the agents arrive at a mutually beneficial out-
come without coordinating their actions explicitly. Since the agents do not interact
and are ex ante symmetric, there is no loss of generality in looking for a solution in
the set of symmetric equilibria.
By the Revelation Principle, the contract can be represented by a direct mech-
anism where each of the agents submits to the principal a report on his type. The
contract specifies the effort levels as a function of the report and transfers as a func-
tion of both outputs. To implement the first-best allocation, the principal requires
the effort of efb = 1 of both types of the agents. To see why each of the transfers
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is a function of both outputs, suppose that agent i is efficient and deviates from his
contractual effort level of 1 by exerting the effort of 1 − ∆θ. Instead of observing
the outputs consistent with the contract, given by
xA = θh + 1, x
B = θB + 1,
where θB = θl, θh, the principal will observe
xA = θl + 1 + α∆θ, x
B = θB + 1 − α∆θ.
Assumption 1 guarantees that she is able to determine the identity of the agent who
has “shirked.”
Following Kofman and Lawarrée (1993), in this section I assume that the prin-
cipal can impose a penalty, P , on the agent found in breach of contract but the
penalty cannot exceed an exogenously given value of Pm > 0. I also assume that
the penalty is independent of the transfer compensating the agent for the exerted
effort.1 As shown in Baron and Besanko (1984), the principle of maximum deter-
rence applies in this setting, hence it suffices to consider the case where the principal
applies the highest possible penalty to the agent found in breach of contract, i.e.,
P = Pm. With these assumptions, the contract offered by the principal, which I
label CB (for benchmark), takes the following form:
{









where tc denotes the transfer to the agent who complies with the contract and tb is
the transfer to the agent who is found to have violated it.
An inefficient agent accepts contract CB, which, provided that he exerts the
required effort level, guarantees him his reservation utility regardless of the type and
the effort level taken by his colleague. In the presence of internal control, the ineffi-
cient agent does not have profitable deviations, hence the contract is also incentive
compatible. Consider now the problem faced by an efficient agent i, i = A,B, and
1That is, the agent is always compensated for his effort but, if found in breach of contract, pays
P to the principal. A very similar result obtains when the principal withholds the compensation for
the effort when the agent violates his contractual obligation; naturally, the set of the parameters
where the first-best allocation is attainable is bigger in that case.
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suppose that he accepts the contract and pursues the following strategy with respect
to the effort level: he deviates from the contract (i.e., chooses e = 1 − ∆θ) with
probability λ ∈ [0, 1] and exerts the contractual effort level with probability 1 − λ.
This strategy is supported by (consistent) beliefs: Pr
{





ej = 1 | θj = θh
}
= 1 − λ, where j = A,B and j 6= i.
Denote by Uh the expected payment to the efficient agent net of the cost of
effort. With probability ν2 both agents are efficient; when this is the case, with
probability λ2 both deviate from the contract and collect the information rent given
by Φ(1). With probability ν(1 − ν), one of the agents deviates and the other does
not; in this case the deviating agent pays the penalty and the agent who sticks with
the contract receives zero rent. Finally, with probability (1 − ν)2 both agents exert
the contractual effort levels and face neither rent nor penalty. Next, with probability
(1 − ν), agent j is inefficient and agent i pays the penalty whenever he deviates,




λ2Φ(1) − λ(1 − λ)Pm
)
















Uh = ν (2P
m + ∆θ(2 − ∆θ)) > 0 ,
where the inequality follows because, by Assumption 2, ∆θ 6 1. That is, Uh is a
convex function of λ and it suffices to consider two limiting cases, λ = 0, where the
efficient agent always deviates, and λ = 1, where he always performs pursuant to
the contract.
Never deviating (i.e., choosing λ = 0) guarantees the efficient agent his reser-
vation utility, hence the participation constraint is satisfied. For contract CB to be




ν∆θ(2 − ∆θ) − Pm(1 − ν) 6 0. (3.1)
The analysis above leads to the following result:
Proposition 4. Under contract CB, the principal attains the first-best allocation if
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and only if
Pm > P0 ≡
∆θν(2 − ∆θ)
2(1 − ν) .
Proof. Solving (3.1) written with equality for Pm establishes the claim.
That is, in the absence of communication between the agents the principal
attains the first-best allocation provided she can impose a sufficiently high penalty
on the agent who is found in breach of contract. Notice, in particular, that the
penalty does not have to be very high. In fact, for ν < ν0, where
ν0 =
1




the net payment to the agent is positive — i.e., the contract is accepted by the
agent even if he has zero wealth and no access to borrowing: see Figure 3.1. It is
also worth noting that, for a sizeable set of parameters where P < P0, the principal







Figure 3.1: The value of P0 as a function of ν for ∆θ = 0.2 .
In other words, internal control can be very effective in preventing the agents
from taking an inappropriate action, provided they find it sufficiently difficult to
collude. Apart from the (somewhat unrealistic) setting where collusion is impossi-
ble owing to the lack of communication, the same result will obtain if with some
probability γ ∈ (0, 1) any given agent is honest — i.e., refuses to collude even if
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doing so is profitable. Much as it is the case with communication, however, the
principal will generally have a little influence over such an intrinsic personal quality
as honesty; in fact, even the ex ante probability γ may be quite difficult to ascertain.
This is one of the reasons to consider the avenues of increasing the value of internal
control that are available to the principal; I do this in Chapter 4.
Two additional observations are in order. First, Proposition 4 shows that in-
finitely costly communication between the agents allows the principal to attain the
first-best allocation at least for some values of the parameters, while with infinite
transaction costs δ the agents still collude in the hh-case. In that sense, the agent’s
ability to communicate is costlier for the principal than their ability to exchange
transfers. Second, in light of this observation, modeling the frictions of side con-
tracting in reduced form as positive transaction costs results in underestimating the
agents’ cost of collusion. As a result, the model provides a conservative estimate
of the value of internal control to the principal. As in Laffont and Meleu (1997),
the non-linearity of transaction costs for δ > 0 corresponds to the intuitive notion
that it is easier to ask for a favor when one can offer something in return. The
difference between the two models is that these authors assume the non-linearity
while in my model it arises endogenously. Notice also that the results reported in
Propositions 1–4 hold for δ = 0, in which case transaction costs are linear. In Sec-
tion 4.3, I dispense with exogenous transaction costs and consider an organizational
arrangement that, under certain conditions, improves the principal’s payoffs relative
to the benchmark value of Π0 defined in Section 3.2.
3.2 Contracting with Both Agents
In this section I relax the assumption that the principal is limited to offering con-
tracts that are symmetric with respect to the agent’s identity. Consider the full
collusion region of parameters first. Since with α > 0 in the hl- and lh-cases the





for the side contract to be profitable, with positive transaction costs of
collusion (i.e., with δ > 0) the principal benefits by maximizing the amount to be
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transferred.2 She can do this by offering the agents a contract specifying effort lev-
els and transfers that, for the case where only one of them is efficient, satisfies the















































provided that the acceptance constraints are not binding (these will be dealt with
presently). It is easy to see that the grand contract satisfying constraints (3.2)
and (3.3) is collusion proof in the hl- and lh-cases because the side contract cannot
provide the inefficient agent (B and A, respectively), with a higher payoff; hence, by
the standard assumption, he chooses the effort level preferred by the principal and
his efficient colleague cannot collect any information rent.
Consider now the hh-case and assume, without loss of generality, that the prin-

























At stage 6 agents report both their types and transfers spelled out in the grand
contract. Again, agent A cannot gain by entering a side contract and agent B
cannot deviate unilaterally; as a result, the grand contract is collusion proof. The























It is shown in the appendix that (3.5) is always implied by (3.6). Finally, the




)2 > 0 , (3.7)
2From now on, I will use the label hl -case to refer to the realization of the efficiency parameters
when agent A only, and lh-case when agent B only, is efficient.
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where i = A,B and j, k = h, l.










hh − tAhh + eBhh − tBhh
)
+ ν (1 − ν)
(
θh + θl + e
A
hl − tAhl + eBhl − tBhl
)
+ ν (1 − ν)
(
θh + θl + e
A
lh − tAlh + eBlh − tBlh
)




ll − tAll + eBll − tBll
)
subject to (3.2), (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), (3.6), and (3.7).
(3.8)
As shown in the Appendix, under contract C3 there are three regions of parameters
that determine the type of the solution (see Figure 3.2): in addition to the Full
Collusion (FC) region where the agents collude in all but the ll-case and the Partial
Collusion (PC) region where they collude only in the hh-case, for sufficiently high
values of δ there now exists one more region, labeled Partial Collusion I (PCI),















Figure 3.2: Three regions characterizing the solution to (3.8).
Lemma 2. Under the optimal collusion-proof contract C3:





lh = 1 = efb , where i = A,B ;
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(a) In the Full Collusion (FC) region:
eAll = 1 − ∆θ
ν
(1 − ν)2
1 − 2α− δ (α− ν(1 − α))
(1 − 2α)(1 + δ) ,
eBll = 1 − ∆θ
ν
(1 − ν)2
1 − 2α− δα(1 − ν)
(1 − 2α)(1 + δ) .
(b) In the Partial Collusion (PC) region:
eAll = 1 − ∆θ
ν2
(1 − ν)2 ,






(c) In the Partial Collusion I (PCI) region:
eAll = 1 − ∆θ
ν
(1 − ν)2
(1 − α)ν − α
(1 − 2α)(1 + δ) ,
eBll = 1 − ∆θ
ν
(1 − ν)2
1 − α(1 + ν)
(1 − 2α)(1 + δ) .
2. The FC region is characterized by α 6 α1 and the PC region is characterized
by α > max {α1, α2}, where
α1 =
(1 + δ)(4 + δ)(1 − ν)2 − ∆θ
(





4(1 + δ)(2 + δ)(1 − ν)2 − ∆θ [(2 + δ)(1 + δ + 2ν) + ν2 (2 − δ(δ − 3))] ,
M1 = (1 − ν)4(1 + δ)
(
δ2 + 4∆θ(1 + δ)
)
− (∆θ)2(1 + δ)(1 − ν)
[




(1 + δ)(4 + δ)(1 − ν)2 − ∆θ
[









(1 + δ)(4 + δ)(1 − ν)2 − ∆θ
(




2(1 + δ)(1 − ν)2 − ∆θ
(





4(1 + δ)(2 + δ)(1 − ν)2 − ∆θ
(





The regions that obtain with an asymmetric contract closely resemble the ones
under a symmetric contract derived in Proposition 1. In fact, tt is easy to check
that α0|δ=0 = α1|δ=0, hence in the absence of transaction costs contracts C1 and C3
result in identical allocations. For future reference, I will denote by Π0 the principal’s
expected payoff under both contracts with δ = 0. Clearly, with positive transaction
costs of collusion δ the principal benefits from treating the agents asymmetrically,
i.e., ΠC3 − ΠC1 > 0.
From the viewpoint of the human resources department, contract C3 can be
interpreted as promoting a randomly chosen agent to a position of a “senior agent.”
Notice that the promotion decision is made before his type is known.3 Furthermore,
it is only valuable to the promoted agent in the hh- and hl-cases where he collects
positive information rent and his colleague collects none — but in the hl-case where
he is efficient and his lower-level colleague is not, it is the latter who collects all in-
formation rent. As a result, this organizational arrangement appears rather peculiar
because organizations where lower-level employees wield all bargaining power in ne-
gotiations with their higher-level colleagues are not very often observed in practice.
I consider a more plausible setting in Section 4.2.
3.3 On the Choice of Productive Technology
In this section, I discuss the extent to which the results are sensitive to the properties
of productive technology used in the model of internal control. Two important
properties are that (i) the agents’ cost functions are additive in the productivity
parameters and (ii) the principal’s value function is additive in both agents’ outputs.
I consider the effects of both of these modeling choices in turn.
3It will be shown in Chapter 4 that in the cases where the agents differ in their ex ante probability
of being efficient, the optimal choice of the agent to be promoted is determined by the parameters
of the model.
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3.3.1 The Cost Function
Early papers in the collusion literature, such as Tirole (1986) and Felli (1990), stud-
ied models where the principal’s value function is linear in the output, the agent’s
cost of effort function, c(e), is convex, and the efficiency parameter enters the output
function additively (i.e., the output is given by x = θ+e). More recent models, such
as Severinov (2005), instead consider settings where the principal’s value function is
concave, the agent’s cost function is linear, and the efficiency parameter represents
variable costs and thus is multiplicative. These three components may be used in
various combinations: for example, in Lawarrée and Shin (2005) the value function is
concave, the cost function is convex, and the efficiency parameter enters the agents’
cost functions multiplicatively. For the most part, the choice of production function
is determined by modeling convenience and is not critical for the results.
In my model, each agent’s efficiency parameter enters his cost function (and,
therefore, the production function) additively and thus represents a fixed benefit
(or cost saving) that only pertains to the agent’s own division. This formulation
captures, in a tractable manner, the well-known fact that some characteristics of the
production process are easier for employees to manipulate than others. To illustrate
this idea, consider the example with design and production engineers introduced
in Chapter 2. Suppose that the productivity parameter represents the design engi-
neer’s creativity, which affects his output but has no bearing on the output of the
production engineer, while his effort determines the quality of the blueprints that
he produces and thus has a direct effect on the output of both divisions. Production
function (2.1) then implies that a creative (i.e., efficient) design engineer who puts in
less effort will produce sloppy blueprints of an innovative design — which, based on
the author’s interactions with design engineers, is not at all an implausible scenario.
That is, using the productivity parameter additively provides a parsimonious
setting that allows me to study internal control as an instrument that makes it
more difficult for employees to take inappropriate actions. In other words, the
way of modeling internal control adopted here captures its essential property: by
making malfeasance more difficult, it reduces, albeit usually does not eliminate, the
probability of it happening. Clearly, this cost function represents a limiting case
where the agent’s productivity parameter affects his division only. The same result,
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however, will hold in a more general setting where it affects the productivity of
the second division as well, so long as the magnitude of the latter effect is not too
high. At the expense of complicating the computations, the cost function can be
also modified so that the productivity parameter enters multiplicatively (i.e., as a
marginal cost). In that case, for internal control to have a bite, the productivity
parameter again will have to have greater effect on the agent’s own division than on
his colleague’s.
3.3.2 The Production Function
The additivity of production function (2.1) in both agents’ effort levels together
with a normalization of the corresponding weights that sum up to unity allows me
to separate the role of productive interdependency as a form of internal control
from its effect on productivity. Indeed, in this formulation the intensity of internal
control α enters the principal’s payoff only via its effect on the cost of collusion.
This separability considerably simplifies comparisons across various organizational
arrangements. In reality, however, interdependencies linking employees’ efforts take
different forms that usually include some multiplicative component. Team synergy,
where the output of the team exceeds the sum of individual contributions, is a
classic example of such a multiplicative interdependency: see Autrey (2005). To
what extent will the results reported in this dissertation change in the presence of
team synergy?




xA(eA, eB) = θA + eA + 1
2
βeAeB ,




where β ∈ [0, 1) represents the degree of productive interdependency, which here
takes the form of team synergy. Production function (3.9) captures the positive
effect that agent i’s effort has on the output of his colleague and thus fits the
examples introduced above. The first-best effort levels are now given by efb =
1
1−β
and the principal’s payoff is increasing in β.
In the hh-case the agents who wish to deviate from the contract and collect
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information rents have to exert effort levels ẽi, and ẽj , where i, j = A,B and i 6= j,
satisfying the following conditions:
∆θ + ẽi +
1
2






∆θ + ẽj +
1
2








































In a similar fashion, we find that in the hl-case, the new effort levels, êi and











































Observe that limβ→0 ẽ
i = eill − ∆θ and limβ→0 êi = eill − ∆θ; hence the result
reported in Proposition 1 holds for β → 0. From the continuity of the principal’s
payoff and the agents’ information rents in β it follows that the result also holds for
sufficiently small β. It is likely that the other results will hold as well, at least for a
subset of the parameters, but the characterization is considerably more complicated.
Since the multiplicative formulation adds little insight to the explication of the
properties of internal control, I do not pursue this avenue further.
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3.4 Discussion
In this chapter, I show that the value of internal control depends critically on the
frictions in side contracting between the agents (in particular, on their ability to
communicate in a credible manner) and, to a certain extent, on the set of feasible
contracts available to the principal. The analysis demonstrates that, so long as the
principal’s ability to influence the mutual dealings between the agents is limited,
she can only do so much in increasing the value of internal control; in particular,
she cannot get rid of collusion altogether. As shown in Section 3.2, the practice of
rewarding employees who refuse to take part in collusion studied formally by Beck
(1986), Jones (1996), and Jones and Griggs (forthcoming), among others, is only
effective under some circumstances (i.e., in the absence of transaction costs) and only
reduces, but does not eliminate, the loss from collusion. Sometimes the principal
can take advantage of the frictions inherent in side contracting that exist because
of its informal, and sometimes covert, nature. For example, Felli (1990) assumes
that the agents can renege on their collusive agreement at any time, provided that
neither of them has started acting according to the agreement, and shows that this
contracting friction alone allows the principal to prevent collusion costlessly.
Relations among the employees constitute what is often referred to as informal
organization, which is shaped, to a large extent, by societal norms and organiza-
tional culture. Although the principal is usually capable of changing the latter, as
shown by, e.g., Hermalin, (2001) and the recent attention to setting the right “tone
at the top” as a means of improving organizational performance, she has at best
a very little influence over the former. On the other hand, it is the principal who
determines the structure of the formal organization, which establishes the hierarchy
of authority. It has been shown in the economics literature that, in the presence of
asymmetric information, the internal organization of a firm, and, in particular, the
degree of centralization, usually affects its performance (see, e.g., Baron and Be-
sanko, 1992). The exact nature of the relationship between the organizational form
and performance, however, is very context specific and sensitive to the specification
of a model, including the type of production function (cf. the discussion above),
information structure, and timing. I investigate the effect of a hierarchical structure





It is shown in Chapter 2 that internal control is inseparable from collusion: with
internal control in place, the agents always desire to engage in collusion, at least
for some realizations of the efficiency parameters. The principal will, therefore, be
interested in minimizing the loss from collusion while maintaining the benefits of
internal control. In particular, she may try to reduce the agents’ benefit from collu-
sion when they choose to engage in it or, ideally, prevent collusion from happening
altogether. It is likely, however, that the principal will be constrained in her choice
of actions to prevent the loss from collusion: for example, communication between
the agents will be possible under all but the rarest of circumstances. In this chapter,
I consider one instrument that is available to many principals in real-life settings:
the choice of the hierarchical structure of the firm.
In many organizations the employees involved in an internal control relationship
occupy different hierarchical levels. In a typical scenario, a decision is made by a
lower-level employee and subsequently ratified by a superior. Somewhat surprisingly,
the tables are often turned, as in the practice of subcertification where financial data
are certified by a subordinate employee who provides the data: see Vance (2007).
A similar practice was adopted in the Soviet Union where all financial documents
required the signatures of both the managing director of an enterprise and the chief
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accountant, even though the latter reported directly to the former. Why does the
principal invest a subordinate with a right to control his boss? And, more generally,
why do internal controls so often involve bosses and subordinates rather than peers
who, by virtue of proximity, are in a better position to observe each other’s actions?
In this chapter I argue that the practice can be explained by studying collusion,
the inevitable by-product of internal control. In particular, I show that, under a
wide range of conditions, the value of internal control is, indeed, increased when the
principal appoints one of the agents to a supervisory position and delegates to him
contracting with the lower-level agent. Interestingly, the principal often optimally
chooses for that position the agent who is less likely to be efficient because, by doing
so, she minimizes the information rent accruing to the supervisor.
At first blush, the notion that a subordinate controls his boss appears to be
counterintuitive. For example, Carmichael (1970) takes it as given that an employee
will not report irregularities involving his supervisor and concludes that a hierarchi-
cal relations between individuals involved in internal control reduces its value. To
reconcile the apparent contradiction, I will point out the crucial difference between
settings where the subordinate has an option to report the inappropriate actions of
his boss — e.g., when he decides whether or not to blow the whistle to the higher-
ups — and settings where the option of “doing nothing” is simply not present —
e.g., when the subordinate has to co-sign a check that will not be accepted without
his signature. Many internal controls used in practice do, indeed, fall into the latter
category where, for a transaction to take place, both employees have to take part
in it, as in opening a safe with two keys or separating the functions of planning
and implementation. In fact, it can be argued that this interdependency of the
employees’ actions is the most important property of internal control.
The benefits of delegation have long been explained in terms of the costs of
communication that are saved when decision-making is pushed down the hierarchical
structure. In my model, the benefits have a different origin: delegation is valuable
because it allows the principal to increase the cost of collusion. Intuitively, since it
usually is more difficult to collude with one’s superior than with a colleague, the
principal benefits from appointing one of the employees to a supervisory position
even if there are no technological reasons to do so. Creating a hierarchical structure
makes it easier for the principal to play one agent against the other, i.e., to use the
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“divide and conquer” strategy known to generations of managers and politicians.
On the other hand, the costs of delegation are usually explained in terms of loss
of control — and this is precisely why internal control enhances the value of del-
egation. That is, both instruments are shown to be complementary; formally, the
principal’s expected payoff as a function of two organizational choices (whether or
not to implement internal control and delegation) is supermodular for a large set of
parameters.1
4.1 Related Literature
The potential value of delegation in mitigating the losses from collusion has been
pointed out in several studies. Baliga and Sjöström (1998) and Macho-Stadler and
Pérez-Castrillo (1998) investigate the properties of centralization and delegation in
a moral hazard environment; Laffont and Martimort (1998) study a model with
adverse selection in a setting similar to the one used in this dissertation. The
technology considered in the latter paper involves two productive agents: agent A
produces the quantity qA of an intermediate good and agent B uses it to produce
the quantity qB of the final good.2 This production function has the property that
qA = qB at the optimum: the outputs are perfect complements and, as noted by
Severinov (2005), the stake for collusion between the productive agents does not
exist (i.e., the agents do not have anything to gain by forming a coalition). To
introduce the possibility of collusion, the authors assume that the principal cannot
distinguish one agent from another; as a result, the contract is anonymous in the
sense that it specifies transfers to the agents as a function of their aggregated reports.
This restriction on the contract space is interpreted as representing the limits on
communication that exist in real-life organizations.
The authors model a collusive agreement as a side contract that specifies a
manipulation of the report of the agents’ types sent to the principal and transfers
between the agents. In a centralized setting, the side contract is superimposed on
1Supermodularity can be interpreted as a generalization of complementarity: see discussion and
references on p. 71.
2A similar model with types having continuous distributions is also used in Baron and Besanko
(1992) to study the optimal internal organization of a firm.
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the grand contract with the principal, while in a decentralized setting it is subsumed
by the “official” employment contract offered by the supervisor to the agent. The
timing of the game is as follows:
1. The principal offers a contract to the supervisor.
2. The supervisor accepts the contract.
3. The supervisor offers a side contract to the agent.
4. The agent accepts the side contract and reports his type to the supervisor.
5. The supervisor reports both his and the agent’s types to the principal
according to the manipulation specified by side contract.
6. The output is produced and the transfers are enforced.
The result is that delegation is preferred to centralization only in the presence of
limits on communication.
The focus of my study, however, is not on collusion per se but on internal
control, which, in a centralized setting, creates a stake for collusion without any
additional assumptions. Even though the value of delegation has been long studied
by organizational theorists (see, e.g., Mookherjee, 2006 and Poitevin, 2000 for recent
reviews), I am not aware of analytical studies investigating the role of delegation in
improving the effectiveness of internal control. One of the results established in the
literature is that the properties of the allocations attainable under delegation are
sensitive to the timing of the game. When the Revelation Principle applies (which
means, in particular, that there is no collusion), delegation is always weakly domi-
nated by centralization. Melumad, Mookherjee, and Reichelstein (1995) have shown
that the two organizational arrangements are equivalent if the principal (i) monitors
the output produced by the supervisor and (ii) contracts with the supervisor before
the latter contracts or communicates with the agent. In the delegated contracting
arrangement that they label H1, the principal monitors the output produced by
each of the agents. The time line of the game is as follows:
1. The principal offers to the supervisor a contract that specifies his compen-
sation as a function of his report on his type and both outputs.
2. The supervisor accepts the contract and sends to the principal the report
about his own type.
3. The supervisor offers a contract to the agent.
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4. The agent accepts the contract and sends a report on his type to the su-
pervisor. Based on the report, the supervisor specifies the level of output
that should be produced by the agent.
5. The supervisor chooses his level of output, both outputs are produced, and
the transfers are made.
The principal does not observe the interaction between the supervisor and
the agent. Further, the supervisor cannot renege on his contractual obligations
after observing the agent’s type. The above sequence of events restricts the set
of possible deviations available to the supervisor because (i) his report cannot be
contingent on the realization of the agent’s type and (ii) only the interim, rather
than ex post, participation constraint of the supervisor has to be satisfied; i.e., for
some realizations of the agents’ type the supervisor may receive negative transfers.
As a result, the potential for the principal’s benefit is maximized.
In an alternative organizational arrangement, labeled H ′1 by the authors, the
timing is modified so that the supervisor does not report his type to the principal
at stage 2 and, instead, contracts with the agent first and later, at stage 5, reports
to the principal both his own and the agent’s types. In addition, the supervisor is
allowed to quit after he learns the agent’s type, thus his participation constraint has
to hold ex post. This setting is similar to the one used in Laffont and Martimort
(1998). The authors show that under H ′1 the supervisor’s information rent is at
least weakly higher than under H1. The papers studying the effect of organizational
arrangement on productivity also include Melumad, Mookherjee, and Reichelstein
(1992), McAfee and McMillan (1995), and Baldenius, Melumad, and Ziv (2002).
In practice, the choice of an organizational arrangement is determined by sev-
eral institutional factors, including the properties of the productive technology, in-
formation structure, and tradition (or organizational inertia). The properties of the
pool of potential job candidates and the requisite skill set also play an important
role. As a result, it may be difficult or impossible to implement the theoretical
recommendations made by managerial economists. In particular, the setting corre-
sponding to the time line just described may be attainable at the divisional level,
where a large segment of an organization is set up as a profit center and the divi-
sion head is delegated considerable discretion in hiring decisions, but infeasible at a
lower level where a supervisor plays a role in the hiring policy but contracting with
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employees is ultimately carried out by the central personnel office. Thus in what
follows I will consider two contractual settings that differ by the degree to which
personnel decisions are delegated to one of the agents.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 4.2 I study the setting with positive
transaction costs where the principal delegates to the supervisor contracting with the
agent. The setting with zero transaction costs is considered in Section 4.3 where the
principal contracts with the supervisor and solicits his report before the supervisor
contracts with the agents. I discuss the value of direct communication between the
agent and the principal in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 The Value of Delegation in the Presence of Trans-
action Costs
4.2.1 The Model
In this chapter I study the same production function (2.1) used in Chapter 2 but
enrich the set of contracts available to the principal. I focus on what I call the main
property of internal control — that with it in place, the agents can profitably devi-
ate from the grand contract only if they coordinate their efforts. Formally, for any




, production function (2.1) is a one-to-one map-








. That is, in contrast to the benchmark case with no internal control where
the principal has to know both efficiency parameters θi to extract the agents’ infor-
mation rents, internal control allows her to attain the same end if she learns just
one efficiency parameter. To take advantage of this property, the principal has to
treat the agents asymmetrically, but exogenous factors such as organizational tradi-
tions or equal opportunity laws may prevent her from doing so (the case considered
in Chapter 2). Indeed, asymmetric mechanisms of the kind proposed by Demski
and Sappington (1984) where the principal, in effect, “bribes” one of the agents to
“snitch” on his colleague(s) may not be feasible in many institutional environments
where the agents value their reputation, as suggested by the uniformly unfavorable
attitude toward finks across different cultures. That is, the approach taken in Chap-
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ter 2 can be seen as a reduced form of a more involved dynamic model where the
agents’ reputational concerns arise endogenously.
One way for the principal to avoid the constraint that both agents be treated
symmetrically is to appoint one of them supervisor and delegate to him the author-
ity to contract with the second agent, who is hereafter referred to as simply the
agent. Based on what we know about organizations, it would be natural to expect
that a supervisor will usually have more bargaining power than his subordinate in
any negotiation, be it over an employment contract or a collusive agreement. The
analysis below shows that, whenever the principal prefers delegation to the cen-
tralized setting studied in Chapter 2, she, indeed, structures her contract with the
supervisor in such a way that the latter has all bargaining power in all his nego-
tiations with the agent. The benefit of delegation thus stems from the ability it
gives the principal to influence the outcome of the collusive agreement and thereby
make collusion costlier for the employees as a group (i.e., easier for her to prevent).
The downside of the delegation is its cost, which typically is brought about by the
loss of control. In my model, the cost of delegation takes the form of the loss of
flexibility in contracting with the agent. Proposition 5, however, demonstrates that,
for a large set of parameters, the benefit outweighs the cost.
The game unfolds according to the following sequence:
0. The principal chooses α that will be implemented.
1. Nature chooses the type of each agent. Each agent learns only his type.
2. The principal proposes a grand contract to agent A (the supervisor). The
supervisor accepts or refuses the contract. If he refuses, the game ends and
all parties receive their reservation utility.
3. If he accepts the grand contract, the supervisor offers a (side) contract to
agent B (the agent).
4. The agents accepts or refuses the contract offered by the supervisor. If he
refuses, the game ends and all parties receive their reservation utility.
5. If the agent accepts the contract, he reports his type to the supervisor.
6. The supervisor reports to the principal the aggregated information accord-
ing to the manipulation specified in his contract with the agent.
7. The supervisor and the agent simultaneously produce their outputs and
transfers specified in respective contracts are made.
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I assume that the principal implements internal control (i.e., α > 0) and ob-
serves the outputs produced by both agents (in the sequel, I will refer to them
collectively as employees). The principal does not interact with the agent directly
but pays his compensation as determined by the contract with the supervisor. This
structure appears to be descriptive of many real-life organizations where the payroll
functions are centralized. I consider the case where the agent receives his transfer
from the supervisor in Section 4.3. The grand contract specifies the output levels










, where the subscripts j, k = h, l
denote the types of agents A and B respectively.
4.2.2 Characterization
As noted before, with internal control in place the employees can collect information
rents only if they coordinate their actions. In the absence of the side contract de-
signer, the agents, therefore, have to disclose their types to each other if they want
to collect any rents. Observe that the supervisor has nothing to lose by truthfully
disclosing his type to the agent because the agent does not communicate with the
principal. Furthermore, if the agent accepts the contract, he will infer the super-
visor’s type from the effort level required of him anyway. The contract offered to
the agent thus closely parallels the side contract considered in Chapter 2 in that
it specifies the manipulation of the report sent to the principal, φ, side transfers
yim, where i,m = A,B, i 6= m, and employees’ effort levels, ẽ, as a function of the















where θA = θh, θl is the type of the supervisor and θ̂ is the report submitted by the
agent. The same property of the production function with internal control assures
that the agent cannot benefit by deviating from the side contract unilaterally and
thus has no choice but to truthfully report his type to the supervisor whenever he
accepts the contract, i.e., θ̂B = θB. As before, side transfers, yim, are subject to
transaction cost, δ, which in this section is assumed to be strictly positive.
In general, the outcome of the negotiations between the supervisor and the
agent, which is conducted under symmetric information, will be a function of their
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relative bargaining power. The principal, however, can influence the negotiation by
her choice of the grand contract. To see how she achieves her goal, consider the hh-
case first and suppose that the supervisor threatens (the agent) to report both types
truthfully and exert the first-best effort level. If this threat is credible, the agent will
be willing to transfer to the supervisor the amount up to his information rent that
he would collect if the supervisor reports θAl , θ
B





assure that the supervisor’s threat is credible, the principal has to pay him more than
he would obtain as a result of the collective deviation just described. In particular,










, the supervisor is indifferent between
the agent’s proposal and exerting the first-best level of effort and, therefore, by the
standard assumption, takes the action preferred by the principal. The outcome of
the side-contracting negotiation given the principal’s grand contract is, therefore,
exactly the same as would obtain in a negotiation in the absence of the principal if
the supervisor held all bargaining power.3
Notice, however, that the grand contract does not allow the principal to transfer
all bargaining power to the agent since she does not contract with him directly. She
would, indeed, have benefitted from doing so in the hl-case (i.e., the case where the
supervisor is efficient and the agent is not) because when the inefficient agent holds
all bargaining power negotiating with the efficient supervisor, the (transaction) cost
of collusion is maximized. It is this loss of flexibility in contracting that was referred
to in Subsection 4.2.1. The next-best alternative is, again, to give all bargaining
power in the hl-case to the supervisor by promising to him the transfers that satisfy

































































3With δ > 0, the principal clearly prefers to transfer all bargaining power to one of the agents,
in this case, the supervisor.
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In general, the bargaining power in the negotiation over an employment agree-
ment will be determined by the properties of the economic environment such as
asset specificity and demand for supervisors and agents. One can, therefore, simply
assume, as do, e.g., Laffont and Martimort (1998), that all bargaining power resides
with the supervisor owing to one of these reasons. It appears that, in many real-life
settings where the supervisor possesses the skills required for production and there
exists a competitive supply of agents such an assumption is, indeed, justified. In
my model, however, this assumption is unnecessary because the same result obtains
endogenously as a part of the optimal contract offered by the principal.
Since the supervisor submits his report to the principal after learning the type of
the agent, a collusion-proof grand contract has to satisfy the incentive compatibility
and participation constraints ex post — i.e., each employee has to receive at least
his reservation utility of 0 in each of the four possible realizations of efficiency
parameters. From the argument above it follows that the incentive compatibility






























where j, k = h, l. Since the agent cannot deviate from the grand contract unless he
cooperates with the supervisor, only the participation constraints (and not incentive
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The solution to problem (4.8) is given in the Appendix. It shows, in particular,





lh = 1 = efb , where i = A,B ,
eAll = 1 − ∆θ
ν
(1 − ν)2 , (4.9)




1 − δ 1 + α
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)
(1 − 2α)(1 + δ)
}
, (4.10)
An inspection of (4.9) and (4.10) reveals that, with positive transaction costs δ,
in the ll-case the agent’s effort is always strictly higher than the supervisor’s; in fact,
when δ is sufficiently high, for some values of the parameters the agent’s effort even
exceeds the first-best level. In addition to productivity improvement, raising eBll has
two effects: it increases the information rent collected by the supervisor in the hh-
and lh-cases but also increases the cost of collusion in these two and, in addition,
in the hl-case. In other words, the benefit of delegation of the type studied in
this section is in reducing the loss from collusion. Notice that, even though both
employees are ex ante identical, in expectation the supervisor’s effort is strictly
lower, and the pay strictly higher, than the agent’s.
The following Proposition characterizes the relevant properties of the resultant
allocation.
Proposition 5. The allocation attainable under the contract with delegation, D1,












That is, with positive transaction costs δ, delegation improves the principal’s
payoff, at least so long as δ is not too large. The exact characterization of the
conditions under which delegation is useful for the principal turns out to be rather
complicated; however, graphical analysis demonstrates that the principal benefits
from centralization for a wide range of δ provided that the probability that an agent
is efficient, ν, is not too low: see Figure 4.1. This is the case because the employees
as a group, if they choose to collude, have to incur the highest transaction cost in the
hh-case, which occurs with probability ν2. As a result, the collusion-proof contract
that maximizes transaction costs owing to delegation saves the principal more the
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Figure 4.1: The sign of ΠD1 − ΠC1 as a function of δ for different
values of ν. In this example, ∆θ = 0.3 and α = 0.1 .
The result reported in Proposition 5 is consistent with the observation that
it is easier for employees to collude with their peers than with superiors. Even
though both types of collusion, which are often referred to as horizontal and vertical,
respectively, are documented in the organizational literature, the latter type is likely
to involve higher costs, including the costs of communication and enforcement of
side contracts. For example, reputational concerns usually take different forms for
managers and workers; as a result, some potentially profitable collusive agreements
may not be self-enforcing. Transaction costs, which are taken as exogenous in this
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study, reflect these and similar contractual frictions.
4.2.3 The Choice of the Supervisor
In the model considered so far, the agents are assumed to be drawn from the same
distribution and are ex ante identical; as a result, the supervisor can be chosen
at random. I rule out the possibility that one of the agents is willing to pay the
principal for the privilege of becoming a supervisor — but even if this is the case,
the employees should again be treated symmetrically unless they have different
willingness to pay for the supervisory position. However, the model allows me to
study the principal’s choice of a supervisor when the employees differ in some respect
that relates to their productivity.
Consider the case where, as in the model introduced in Chapter 2, the employ-
ees’ efficiency parameters are the same — say, owing to the technological environ-
ment — but the employees are now drawn from two populations that differ in the ex
ante probability that any given employee is efficient. One can, for example, think of
education (on-the-job training, certification, etc.) as an imperfect screening device
that filters out some, but not all, agents with a low efficiency parameter. Formally,
assume that agent A is efficient with probability ν ∈ (0, 1) and agent B is efficient
with probability κν, where κ > 1 and κν < 1. As before, the two probabilities are
uncorrelated. The model studied above can then be interpreted as a special case
with κ = 1; I assume that κ > 1 in this subsection only. Denote by Πi, i = A,B,
the principal’s expected payoff when agent i is appointed supervisor. The following
result characterizes the principal’s decision with respect to the appointment.
Proposition 6. In the full collusion region, the principal’s expected payoffs under




> 0 ⇔ ∆θ < min {∆θ0, ∆θ1} ,
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where ∆θ0 is determined from Assumption 2 and ∆θ1 is given by
∆θ1 = 2(1 − 2α)(1 + δ)
(
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According to Proposition 6, the principal appoints to the supervisory position
the agent who is less likely to be efficient if the difference in efficiency parameters,
∆θ, does not exceed a critical value given by ∆θ1 (see Figure 4.2). The choice of the
supervisor affects the principal’s payoff via two channels: it affects (i) productivity
because, in a generic case, the expected effort levels of the employees are different and
(ii) the cost of collusion because the more likely it is that an inefficient supervisor
is paired with an efficient agent, the higher the transaction cost of collusion and
the easier it is for the principal to prevent it. The principal’s choice is, therefore,
determined by the relative magnitudes of these two effects: when the difference in



















The result reported in Proposition 6 is consistent with real-life settings where
supervisors do not have to be particularly good at productive tasks, so long as
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they possess the requisite leadership qualities. For example, Sergei Korolyov, the
Chief Designer of the Soviet space program, was admired for his leadership more
than for his engineering prowess. A somewhat similar result is reported in Hart
and Moore (2005), who show, in a different setting, that the agent’s seniority in a
hierarchy should always be inversely related to his probability of having a a useful
idea. In contrast, my result demonstrates that the optimal appointment decision is
contingent on the parameters of the model.
The model presented here highlights another reason for this somewhat coun-
terintuitive finding. In my setting, the employee’s willingness to collude is closely
related to his type because the presence of at least one efficient employee is a nec-
essary condition for collusion to occur. In that sense, the inefficient employee is
“honest” — so long as his colleague is also inefficient. With positive transaction
costs, however, appointing an inefficient employee to a position where he holds all
bargaining power in the negotiations over the side contract is the next-best alterna-
tive to having a truly honest employee in that position. Proposition 6 shows that,
if the difference in productivities is not too high, the employee who is least likely to
take part in collusion (for whatever reason) should be appointed to the supervisory
position. The result is consistent with the current debate over corporate governance
where the “tone at the top” is one of the recurring themes but draws attention to
the dependence of the optimal appointment decision on the organizational charac-
teristics.
4.3 The Value of Sequential Contracting
As shown in the previous section, with positive transaction costs, δ, the principal
can benefit from structuring the contractual arrangement with the agents in such
a way as to maximize the cost of collusion. She attains this goal by treating the
agents asymmetrically, subject to the constraints on the set of feasible contracts.
It is, however, somewhat disconcerting that the results disappear in the absence
of transaction costs: indeed, in this case, contract D1 considered in the previous
section provides no benefit over the symmetric contract C1. The strongest argument
against the assumption of positive transaction costs is not that collusive agreements
in reality are frictionless, for they usually are not; rather, it is that transaction
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costs are taken as exogenous to the model. A more satisfying approach would be
to either endogenize them, as does, e.g., Martimort (1997) in a model of repeated
interaction, or consider a setting where the results hold for δ = 0. In the remainder
of the chapter, I take the second route.
The value of sequential contracting has been pointed out in the literature. In
particular, Severinov (2005) shows, in a different model, that the timing considered
in the previous section gives the supervisor the benefit of knowing the agent’s type
before submitting his report to the principal. Formally, in this case the participation
and incentive compatibility constraints have to hold ex post, limiting the principal’s
ability to extract information rents from the employees. Can the principal do better
if she solicits the supervisor’s report before he contracts with the agent? As we shall
see presently, the answer is yes, under certain conditions. The answer is, again,
determined by the main property of internal control.
Recall that, with internal control in place, the supervisor costlessly learns the
type of the agent and leaves him no information rent. It is, therefore, tempting
to look for a solution where the principal contracts with the supervisor up front,
pays him his information rent only, and extracts the agent’s rent for free; better
yet, if she could “sell” the firm to the first agent, the scope of collusion and, with
it, both information rents would disappear altogether. It is safe to assume that the
latter option is ruled out by the supervisor’s limited wealth and various institutional
constraints. The former option, however, could only be feasible if the supervisor
credibly commits to exert the exact effort level required by the principal. In the
absence of a commitment mechanism, the supervisor will have a strong incentive to
deviate from his contractual effort level owing to the same main property of internal
control, the flip side of which is that employees can produce any vector of outputs
they want. In some anticipation, it should be noted that this latter property makes
the characterization of incentive-compatible contracts with sequential contracting
rather complicated and prevents me from giving a more definitive answer to the
question posited above.
Before describing the game, I have to explain the role that delegation plays
in this section. The main advantage of sequential contracting is that one of the
employees — the supervisor — signs his contract before he has a chance to com-
municate with his colleague and cannot quit after the communication takes place.
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This structure fits well with the settings where the agent is hired after the appoint-
ment of the supervisor. It is, however, unlikely that the principal could force both
agents to sign their contracts before learning each other’s types because this is only
possible when both potential employees have already been identified and there will
be a strong incentive for them to communicate. One way to interpret the model
is, therefore, that delegation makes sequential contracting feasible — and it is the
latter that proves to be valuable to the principal under a wide range of conditions.
It is also worth noting that, by focusing on the setting where the supervisor holds
all bargaining power and there are no frictions in side contracting, I give collusion
its best chance at taking a bite off the principal’s payoff.
4.3.1 The Model
The timing of the game is as follows:
0. The principal chooses α and r(·) that will be implemented.
1. Nature chooses the type of each agent. Each agent learns only his type.
2. The principal proposes a grand contract to agent A (the supervisor). The
supervisor accepts or refuses the contract. If he refuses, the game ends and
all parties receive their reservation utility.
3. If the supervisor accepts the grand contract, he reports his type to the
principal.
4. The supervisor offers a contract to the agent. If he refuses, the game ends
and all parties receive their reservation utility.
5. If the agent accepts the contract, he reports his type to the supervisor.
6. The supervisor reports the type of the agent to the principal.
7. The supervisor and the agent simultaneously produce their outputs and
transfers specified in respective contracts are made.
The main difference between this time line and the one studied in Section 4.2 is
that the supervisor reports his type before he learns the type of the agent; hence the
reference to the ex ante participation constraint. As noted before, the agent does not
collect any information rent because he cannot profitably deviate from the contract
with the supervisor. Since the agent does not communicate with the principal, the
supervisor reveals his type to the agent and offers him a menu consisting of two pairs
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, where j is the type of the supervisor
and k = l, h. There is no information asymmetry between the supervisor and the
agent; hence the pair can be treated as a single productive unit. The Revelation
Principle applies, and there is no loss of generality in considering grand contracts
that represent direct revelation mechanisms. Denote by Tjk the transfers from the
principal to the supervisor made under the grand contract. Formally, the grand






. That is, the principal pays the supervisor —
and he, in turn, compensates the agent. One way to justify the assumption of
zero transaction costs adopted in this section is that the side contract between the
supervisor and the employee is subsumed by the “official” employment contract,
which is enforced by the courts.
To save space, it is convenient to denote by Ujk the transfers net of correspond-









notation, the interim participation constraints, one for each type of the supervisor,
take the following form:
νUlh + (1 − ν)Ull > 0 if θA = θl , (4.11)
νUhh + (1 − ν)Uhl > 0 if θA = θh . (4.12)
Since only ex ante participation constraints have to be satisfied, the principal can set
the transfers in such a way that, for some realizations of the efficiency parameters,
the net transfers Ujk are negative.
Incentive compatibility constraints are determined by the deviations available
to the supervisor. In general, there are two types of deviations. First, he can misrep-
resent his type at stage 3 and then at stage 5 either misrepresent the agent’s type
or report it truthfully. Alternatively, he can report his type truthfully and only
misrepresent the agent’s type at stage 5. Since the production function allows the
productive unit headed by the supervisor to produce any pair of outputs required
by the principal by choosing the effort levels appropriately, all possible deviations
are feasible. In addition, one also has to consider the inverse incentive compatibil-
ity constraints that arise because, if the net transfer is negative, the supervisor is
sometimes better off claiming that one of the employees is more efficient than is the
case. One difficulty inherent in characterizing any incentive-compatible contract in
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this setting is that the constraints interact and there is no way to rule out any of
them a priori.
There are many contracts that satisfy (4.11), (4.12), and the set of incentive
compatibility constraints. Since my goal is to find a contract that outperforms the
one derived under a centralized arrangement, I cannot simply take the effort levels
that are optimal in the benchmark setting and check whether these can be induced
by the new contract. My goal in this section, therefore, is to give an example of a
contract, which I label D2, that is feasible and incentive compatible and characterize
the conditions under which it is preferred to the benchmark contract that guarantees
the principal the payoff of Π0 defined on p. 44 in Section 3.2.
4.3.2 Characterization
Consider first the case where the supervisor is inefficient and assume that he has
truthfully reported this fact to the principal at stage 3; later I will check to see that
he, indeed, does not benefit by misreporting his type. If he finds that the agent









as shown above, this expression is always nonnegative, the incentive compatibility
constraint is given by









Clearly, it will be satisfied with equality at the optimum. Solving (4.11) and (4.13)
written with equality yields the following pair of transfers:





















6 0 . (4.15)
Depending on the combination of binding incentive compatibility constraints, the
principal may choose some other pair of transfers, in which case at least one of (4.11)
and (4.13) will not be binding. In what follows, I assume that transfers (4.14) and
(4.15) are a part of D2 and characterize the conditions under which the contract is
incentive compatible.
Consider next the case where the supervisor draws the high realization of his
productivity parameter. He can claim to be inefficient at stage 3 and later report
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that the agent’s type is either high or low. I will assume that, whenever the efficient
supervisor misreports his type to the principal, he always reports at stage 5 that
the agent is inefficient (i.e., that the binding constraints are hh–ll and hl–ll) and
later characterize the conditions under which this deviation is the most profitable
for the supervisor (i.e., that constraints hh–lh and hl–lh are slack). Intuitively, this
will be the case when Ull is not too low — i.e., when both ν and α are not too high.
The grand contract, therefore, has to satisfy (with equality) the following incentive
compatibility constraints:


















where Ull is given by (4.15).
The conditions under which the remaining incentive compatibility constraints
and the participation constraint for an efficient supervisor, (4.12), are not binding






lh = 1 = efb , where i = A,B ,




1 − 2α , (4.18)




1 − 2α . (4.19)
As in contract D1, the effort level required of the agent the ll-case is always higher
than that required of the supervisor; furthermore, the agent’s effort exerted in this
case always exceeds the first-best level of 1. The relevant properties of the contract
are summarized below.
Proposition 7. The following two properties hold for contract D2:










2(1 − 2α)2(1 − ν)2
(1 − 2α(1 − α)) (1 + ν2) ,
νic1 =




1 + α (3α(2 − α) − 4)
)
4α(1 − α) ,
νic2 =




2 − 7α(1 − α)
)
(1 − 2α)2 .
2. Whenever contract D2 is incentive compatible, it outperforms the benchmark
contract with δ = 0. That is, ΠD2 − Π0 > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
According to Proposition 7, two incentive compatibility constraints and one ac-
ceptance constraint determine the shape of the region of parameters where contract
D2 is incentive compatible. The (hh → lh) incentive compatibility constraint, rep-
resented by νic1 in Figure 4.3, becomes binding when the supervisor in the hh-case
benefits from claiming the lh-case and changing both efforts accordingly (instead of
claiming the ll-case, as he does under contract D2). The reverse incentive compati-
bility constraint (hl → hh), which is represented by νic2, becomes binding when the
efficient supervisor who has drawn an inefficient agent (the hl-case) benefits from
claiming that the agent is efficient (hh-case) and adjusting the effort levels. Both
of these constraints are brought about by the ex ante nature of the participation
constraints, which, combined with risk neutrality of the employees, allow the prin-
cipal to pay the supervisor negative net transfers when the agent turns out to be
inefficient. The acceptance constraint is the only one of the three that depends on
∆θ: it shifts to the left as ∆θ increases, and the incentive-compatibility region (the
hatched area in Figure 4.3) shrinks. The acceptance constraint is closely related to
the interim participation constraint for the efficient supervisor given by (4.12).
When the principal implements contract D2, she distorts the effort levels in
the ll-case only and requires the first-best effort levels in the remaining three cases.
Figure 4.3 shows that she does it when the probability ν takes relatively low values —









ºa for Δθ = 0.2
Figure 4.3: The hatched region represents the set S defined in
Proposition 7. The variable νa solves the acceptance
constraint (A.45) written with equality.
characterized in Proposition 7, the principal will likely distort the effort levels in
some of the remaining three states as well. In particular, when an inverse incentive
compatibility constraint is binding, the principal may choose to distort the effort
levels in one of the “efficient” states — for example, in the hh-state if the constraint
(hl → hh) is binding — or to adjust the transfers in one of the “less efficient” states
other than ll. In this case, the benefit from delegation may be reduced but it will
likely remain positive for at least some values of the parameters.
The following corollary follows immediately from Proposition 7.
Corollary 2. (α, ν, ∆θ) ∈ S ⇒ ∂
∂α
ΠD2 > 0 .
Proof. See Appendix.
As before, whenever the parameters of the model belong to set S and the
principal chooses to implement internal control, she sets α = α. The principal’s
choice of the organizational form is binary; I will use an indicator variable η ∈ {0, 1}
to denote her choice with respect to the organizational form, with η = 1 (η = 0)
corresponding to the case where delegation is (is not) implemented. The principal’s
expected payoff can then be written as a function of two variables, one continuous
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and one discrete: Π = Π(α, η).4 With this notation, the preceding analysis can be
succinctly summarized as follows.
Proposition 8. Suppose that (α, ν, ∆θ) ∈ S. Then Π(α, η) is supermodular.
Proof. By Proposition 5 in Severinov (2005), we have Π(0, 0) = Π(0, 1). Proposi-
tion 7 implies that Π(α, 1) > Π(α, 0) ∀α ∈ S. After rearranging, we obtain
Π(α, 1) − Π(0, 1) > Π(α, 0) − Π(0, 0) ∀α ∈ S,
which establishes the claim.
Supermodularity as a generalization of the Edgeworth’s notion of complemen-
tarity was introduced in Topkis (1978) and further developed by Milgrom and
Roberts (1990a, 1990b, 1995), among others.5 In this setting, the principal’s choice
of the organizational form is represented by a binary set, hence the definition of com-
plementarity involving positive mixed-partial derivatives cannot be applied. Since
the choice set is linearly ordered, supermodularity is the appropriate notion. Stated
informally, the main result of this chapter is that internal control and hierarchi-
cal structure involving delegation are complementary instruments for two different
types of delegation and a wide range of parameters: see Figure 4.4.6 Notice that
the analysis above ignores potential benefits of delegation stemming from the costs
of communication that it allows saving. As shown in the literature on delegation,
such cost saving can be substantial, in which case the benefit of delegation will be
even higher.
The mechanism that brings about the results reported in this section is distinct
from the one that is at work in Section 4.2. Here, by using sequential contracting,
the principal compels the supervisor to internalize the benefit of internal control —
but only to a certain extent: as shown in the proof of Proposition 7, an efficient
supervisor’s always receives strictly positive expected information rent. In other
4It follows from Corollary 2 that the principal’s decision to implement internal control can also
be represented by a binary variable.
5See also Topkis (1998) for a book-length explication of supermodularity.
6As shown in Chapter 3, in the presence of transaction costs a hierarchical structure that does










Figure 4.4: The supermodularity of internal control and hierarchi-
cal structure. The parameters are: α = 0.1, ν = 0.35,
∆θ = 0.25, θl = 0.
words, contract D2 falls short of outright “selling” the business to the supervisor,
since the principal’s payoff depends on the realizations of both efficiency parameters,
and the resultant allocation falls short of the first best. Notice also that, by the
continuity of the principal’s payoff in δ, the ranking of the contracts reported in
Proposition 7 also holds in the presence of transaction costs for sufficiently small δ.
4.3.3 The Choice of the Supervisor
In parallel with Subsection 4.2.3, consider now the principal’s choice of the supervisor
in the case where the ex ante probabilities that the agents are efficient differ slightly.7
As before, assume, without loss of generality, that employee A is efficient with
probability ν and employee B is efficient with probability κν, where κ > 1 and
κν < 1. Denote by ΠiD2 the principal’s payoffs under contracts D
i
2, where employee
i = A,B is appointed supervisor. The following result holds:
Proposition 9. Suppose the parameters of the model belong to the set where con-
tracts DA2 and D
B




> 0 ⇔ ∆θ < 2(1 − 2α)
2(1 − ν)(1 − κν)
(1 − 2α(1 − α)) (1 + κν2) .
7The assumption that the difference is small allows me to appeal to the continuity of constraints
and, by so doing, sidestep the arduous process of checking them one by one.
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Proof. See Appendix.
That is, whenever the principal implements contract D2, she almost always
appoints the employee who is less likely to be efficient to the supervisory position
so long as the difference in efficiency is not too high. This result is consistent
with the one reported in Proposition 6 and is even more straightforward to explain
in the setting with sequential contracting: as noted above, an efficient supervisor
collects positive information rent in expectation while an efficient agent does not.
Appointing the employee who is less likely to be efficient to the supervisory position,
therefore, allows the principal to reduce the amount of information rent that he will
collect (with probability κν) if he turns out to be efficient.
4.4 On the Value of Vertical Communication
In the previous sections it was assumed that the agent cannot communicate with
the principal directly. Although such lack of communication is descriptive of many
companies where the top executives are usually quite difficult to get access to, it
stands in apparent contradiction to the recent trend, promoted in part by SOX, of
establishing “hot lines” or communication channels allowing the employees to “blow
the whistle” to a higher authority about the (alleged) misconduct of their superiors.
Whistleblowing has long attracted the attention of researchers in management (see,
e.g., Near and Miceli, 1996), law (see, e.g., Callahan, Dworkin, Fort, and Schipani,
2002), and, more recently, economics. Analytical studies of whistleblowing in the
economics tradition include Friebel and Raith (2004), who show that allowing the
agent to “snitch” on an unproductive supervisor can provides incentives for the
latter to hire unproductive agents, and Ting (2007), who presents a model of a
public agency and demonstrates that allowing whistleblowing can undermine the
supervisor’s ability to discipline the agent.
The question that arises in the setting studied in this chapter is, can the prin-
cipal benefit from allowing the agent to communicate with her directly? Consider
delegation with sequential contracting and suppose that the agent can credibly com-
municate the type of the supervisor, which he learns in the course of negotiation
73
over his contract, to the principal. This ability will benefit the agent since he will
have more bargaining power in his negotiation with the supervisor and receive some
information rent — but, with zero transaction costs, the total cost to the principal of
making the contract incentive compatible will remain the same. In other words, the
agent’s ability to communicate “over the head” of his supervisor benefits the agent
but not the principal. This observation is consistent with reports that unscrupulous
employees do, indeed, abuse whistleblowing: see, e.g., Geller (2004).
Under what conditions would the principal be worse off by establishing a com-
munication channel required by SOX? She will stand to lose if, for example, the
receipt of a complaint from an employee triggers a costly investigation. Note that,
since the contract is incentive compatible, the supervisor has already truthfully re-
ported his type to the principal, so the agent does not have any new information to
convey. It is also likely that in real-life settings the agent who informs higher-ups
and observes no response will be compelled to blow the whistle externally — usually
to the authorities or the press — in which case the principal will bear some costs.
Finally, the agent’s ability to use a threat of communicating with the principal
and extract higher payments from the supervisor will sometimes force the latter do
demand a higher pay. I leave the investigation of these settings for future research.
4.5 Discussion
In this chapter, I consider several avenues of increasing the value of internal control
available to the principal. I show that she can eliminate the scope for collusion
completely only if she “sells” the business to one of the employees, in which case the
latter fully internalizes the benefits of internal control and the first-best allocation
obtains. In organizational arrangements that fall short of this most radical one,
the scope for collusion always remains, at least for one realization of the efficiency
parameters (the hh-case). In the presence of transaction costs of collusion, the
principal benefits from contracting with both employees and treating them asym-
metrically. In organizational settings where employees occupying identical positions
have to be treated equally for exogenous reasons, the principal, for a wide range of
parameters, benefits by appointing one of the employees to a supervisory position.
Promoting one of the employees also makes possible sequential contracting where
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the supervisor has to report his type to the principal before he hires the agent.
Under some conditions, such a hierarchical structure increases the value of internal
control even in the absence of transaction costs of collusion. When one of the agents
is more likely than the other to be efficient ex ante, for a wide range of parameters
the principal optimally promotes the agent who is less likely to be efficient because
doing so reduces the loss from collusion.
The main property of internal control that is behind the results reported in this
chapter is that, with it in place, the employees can take advantage of the information
asymmetry at the principal’s expense only if they coordinate their actions. In effect,
the principal creates a hierarchical structure, with or without delegation, to play one
of the agents against the other by writing the contract with the supervisor in such
a way that he has all bargaining power in his negotiation with the agent over their
collusive agreement that is subsumed by the “official” employment contract. In the
model considered in Section 4.2, giving one of the employees all bargaining power in
negotiating with his colleague maximizes the expected transaction cost of collusion,
thus making collusion easier to prevent. As shown in Section 3.2, in the absence of
restrictions on the contract form, the principal can do better by contracting with
both agents, although in this case she still “promotes” one of them and in effect
again creates a hierarchical arrangement.
The model studied in Section 4.3 does not depend on the presence of (ex-
ogenous) transaction costs: in it, the benefit of creating a hierarchical structure is
brought about by the combination of employees’ risk neutrality and the principal’s
ability to contract with the supervisor before he learns the type of the agent —
i.e., before the agent is hired (hence the term sequential contracting). The analysis
demonstrates that the main property of internal control — that, with it, the agents
have to collude if they want to collect information rents — cuts both ways because
the employees’ ability to produce any output levels they like limits the principal’s
ability to take full advantage of sequential contracting. In particular, when the in-
tensity of internal control α is sufficiently high, the employees may claim that at
least one of them is more efficient than is the case. Nonetheless, she benefits from
delegation with sequential contracting for some values of parameters. In fact, the
latter organizational arrangement beats simultaneous contracting with both agents
when transaction costs are sufficiently low.
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The results reported in this chapter contribute to the literature on delegation
by focusing on its property that so far has been, to a large degree, overlooked by
researchers: its ability to increase the value of internal control. It is not a mere
coincidence that the two phenomena work so well together. To see this, notice that
the value of the main property of internal control described above to the principal
stems from the ability that it gives her to learn the efficiency parameter of one
employee as soon as she learns the efficiency parameters of his colleague. That
is, the principal can control the lower-level employee, at least to a certain extent,
without interacting with him directly. We know from the delegation literature that
the loss of control is the main cost of delegation; internal control is valuable in this
setting precisely because it allows the principal to obtain the benefit of delegation
while limiting its cost. In other words, internal control and delegation are shown
to be complementary instruments. The model thus helps explain why one of the
employees involved in internal control so often directly reports to the other. An
immediate corollary that follows from the above results is that, even though the
principal may delegate contracting with the agent to the supervisor, she always
reads the report provided by the internal control system herself. The practice,
where the internal audit department usually reports directly to the board, bears out
this prediction of the model. It is also reassuring that the results reported in this





One property of internal control, one of the oldest instruments in the managerial
toolbox, is that implementing it creates the possibility of collusion among employees.
In this dissertation, I use the principal–agent framework to explicate this property
and investigate the effect of internal control on the welfare of shareholders (repre-
sented by the principal) and employees (represented by the agents). I show that,
when the agents find it relatively easy to collude, implementing internal control
decreases agency welfare, harming the principal and the agents viewed as a group,
but, in the presence of positive transaction costs of collusion, increases productive
efficiency. When this is the case, the principal, under certain conditions, can in-
crease her expected payoff by using internal control as a threat instead of actually
implementing it. If the available technology does not allow the principal to com-
pletely eliminate productive interdependency, which makes internal control possible,
she sometimes benefits from reducing the accuracy of the accounting information
system, which is an integral part of the internal control system.
The analysis demonstrates that, unless the principal can substantially increase
the cost of communication between the agents or “sell” the business to one of them,
eliminating collusion is infeasible — yet, for a large set of parameters, the benefit
from implementing internal control outweighs the loss from collusion. Since in real-
life settings the principal’s ability to affect mutual dealings among employees is at
best limited and liquidity constraints usually render the “sell-out” solution impos-
sible, internal control virtually always operates under the shadow of collusion. It
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turns out, however, that one instrument available to the principal — the choice of
organizational form — can be very effective in minimizing the loss from collusion
and thus maximizing the value of internal control.
In particular, the principal benefits from creating a hierarchical structure, even
if there is no technological reason to do so. I study two different versions of the model
corresponding to the settings with and without transaction costs of collusion and
show that appointing one of the agents supervisor and delegating to him the task
of contracting with the lower-level agent increases the value of internal control for a
wide range of parameters. Even though the mechanisms behind the results in the two
settings are distinct, the intuition is similar in both cases: by creating a hierarchy,
the principal compels the supervisor to internalize, if only partially, the value of
internal control. As a result, two instruments of corporate governance — internal
control and delegation — are shown to be complementary in many situations. The
model also demonstrates that, when one of the agents is more likely to be efficient ex
ante than the other, in most circumstances appointing to the supervisory position
the one who is less likely to be efficient reduces the principal’s loss from collusion.
At least to some extent, the results reported here are sensitive to the modeling
choices made to keep the model tractable. A simple productive technology that
is additive in the agents’ outputs captures the essential feature of many internal
controls and, especially, the segregation of duties, which makes the agents’ outputs
interdependent so that no inappropriate action can be taken by any agent unilater-
ally. The additive production technology considerably simplifies comparisons across
various regimes and, as argued in Chapter 3, modifying it to include a multiplicative
element representing team synergy does not appear to alter the qualitative nature
of the results. The formulation adopted in this dissertation is sufficiently general
and, in particular, does not require that the agents’ actions and outputs be similar.
For simplicity, I normalize the coefficients in productive function (2.1) so that
the interdependencies are symmetric in both directions and assume that produc-
tion takes place simultaneously. A natural extension of the model would consider a
setting where production is sequential (as, e.g., in Baliga and Sjöström, 1998) and,
as a result, the interdependency is asymmetric because the agent who is the last
to take his action can adjust his effort knowing the action of the colleague. Like-
wise, the model can be extended by considering a continuous distribution of types.
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Since the probability of both agents having the same type is zero in this case, the
agents will have to exchange transfers with probability one and the characteristics
of the contract will depend on expected transfers, which will be determined by the
properties of the distribution. The model can also be easily extended to the case of
n > 2 agents, where the principal will choose different interdependency parameters
so that the output is informative about the identity of the deviating agent. Finally,
one can open the “black box” and study an extensive-form model of bargaining be-
tween the agents. Insofar as the principal, in real-life settings, is capable of affecting





Proof of Lemma 1
Since transfers to the agents in the ll-case, tll, only enter participation constraint







. Next, observe that Φ′(e) = ∆θ > 0, hence incentive compatibility
constraint (2.13) is always binding at the optimum. The type of compensation
scheme offered by the principal will be determined by the sign of R(ell) defined by
(2.17):
R(ell) = Ψ(ell) − (1 + δ)ψ(ell)
= ell∆θ
1 − 2α − αδ
1 − 2α − (∆θ)
2 1 − 2α(1 − α) + α2δ
2(1 − 2α) ,




∆θ(1 + αδ) + ellδ(1 − 2α)
(1 − 2α)3 < 0,
R(ell) is decreasing in α monotonically. Denote by α0 = α0(δ,∆θ, ν) the solution
to R(ell) = 0. Next, we have
R(ell)|α=0 = 12∆θ(2ell − ∆θ) > 0,
where the inequality follows by Assumption 2. Therefore, α0 > 0, and the FC region
is characterized by α ∈ (0, α0). With α > α0, the agents collude only in the hh-case.
I will consider both regions in turn.
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i. Full Collusion Region.











which is positive for α < 1
2+δ
. Letting α1 denote the solution to R(e) = 0, we find
that
α0 − α1 =
√
e2δ2 + ∆θ(4e− ∆θ)(1 + δ) − eδ
(4e− ∆θ)(2 + δ) > 0,
where the inequality follows by Assumption 2. That is, for α 6 α0, R′(e) > 0 and
therefore incentive compatibility constraints (2.19) and (2.20) are binding at the
optimum. Substituting binding incentive compatibility and participation constraints






θh + ehh − 12(ehh)
2 − Φ(ell)
)
+ 2ν(1 − ν)
(
θh + ehl − 12(ehl)





+ 2(1 − ν)2 (θl + ell) ,
(A.1)
where j, k = A,B. The solution to (A.1) is given by
ehh = ehl = elh = 1 = efb, (A.2)




1 − δ(1 − ν)
(2 + δ)(1 − 2α)
)
. (A.3)
Denote by α0 the smaller of the two solutions to R (ell), where ell is given by (A.3):
α0 =
(4 + δ)(1 − ν)2 − ∆θ
(







4(1 − ν)2 − ∆θ
(





(4 + δ)(1 − ν)2 − ∆θ
(
1 + 2ν(1 + δ) + ν2(1 − δ)
))2
− (2 + δ)
(
(2 − ∆θ)(1 + ν2) − 4ν
) (








The full collusion region is characterized by α 6 α0.
ii. Partial Collusion Region.




< 0: the agents do not collude in the hl-case and the






θh + ehh − 12(ehh)
2 − Φ(ell)
)
+ 2ν(1 − ν)
(
θh + ehl − 12(ehl)
2 + θl + elh − 12(elh)
2
)
+ 2(1 − ν)2 (θl + ell) ,
(A.4)
The solution to (A.4) is given by
ehh = ehl = elh = 1 = efb,
ell = 1 − ∆θ
ν2
(1 − ν)2 .
(A.5)
Given that the objective function is (weakly) concave and the constraint set is
convex, the proposition is proved.
Proof of Proposition 1
i. Full Collusion Region.
Productive efficiency is given by
EFCC1 = 2ν
2ehh + 2ν(1 − ν) (ehl + elh) + 2(1 − ν)2ell.
Substituting the values from (A.2), (A.3) and (2.8) and simplifying, we obtain
EFCC1 − ENC = 2δν∆θ
1 − ν
(2 + δ)(1 − 2α) > 0 ,
with strict inequality for δ > 0.
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To evaluate the principal’s expected payoff, consider first the case of δ = 0.
Substituting the effort levels given by (A.2) and (A.3) into the principal’s objective







(1 − 2α)2(1 − ν)2
[




2(1 − ν)2 > 0 ,
where the first inequality follows from α < 1
2
and ΠNC is given by (2.9). Since in
the FC region the principal’s expected payoff with internal control, ΠFCC1 , is clearly
increasing in δ while ΠNC is not a function of δ, we have Π
FC
C1
− ΠNC > 0 for all
δ > 0.
Since both agents supply the first-best levels of effort in the hh- and hl-cases,
agency welfare under the contract C1 is given by
WFCC1 = ν
2 (2θh + 1) + 2ν(1 − ν) (θl + θh + 1)
+ 2(1 − ν)2
(









(1 − ν) − (2 − 2α(2 + δ) + δν)
2
(1 − 2α)2(2 + δ)2
)
, (A.6)
where WNC is given by (2.11).
Solving WFCC1 −WNC = 0 for α yields
α⋆C1 =
4ν + 2δν(3 + ν) − δ(2 + δ)
(√









ii. Partial Collusion Region.
Substituting the values from (A.5) and (2.8) and simplifying, we obtain
EPCC1 − ENC = 2ν(1 − ν)∆θ > 0 .
Substituting (A.5) into the principal’s objective function (A.4) and simplifying
yields










1 − 2ν(1 − ν2)
]
> 0 ,
where the first inequality follows from Assumption 2 and ΠNC is given by (2.9).
After substituting the value of ell given by (A.5) into the expression for agency
welfare and simplifying, we obtain
WPCC1 −WNC = (∆θ)
2ν2
1 − ν − ν2
(1 − ν)2 ,






Proof of Corollary 1
Substituting the effort levels given by (A.2) and (A.3) in the principal’s objective





(1 − 2α)3(2 + δ)2(1 − ν)×
×
(
δ(1 − 2α)(2 + δ)(1 − ν)2 + ∆θ
[
(2 + δ)(1 + αδ)(1 + ν2) − 4ν(1 + δ) − δ2ν2
])
.
From Assumption 2 and (A.3) it follows that
∆θ 6 (1 − 2α)(2 + δ)(1 − ν)
2
(1 − α(1 + ν2)) (2 + δ) − 2ν(1 − ν)(1 + δ) . (A.7)
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4ν(1 + δ)(2 + δ)(1 − ν)5
(1 − 2α) [(2 + δ) (1 − α(1 + ν2)) − 2ν(1 − ν)(1 + δ)]2
> 0,
where the second inequality follows because ∆θ > 0 and hence the denominator in
(A.7) is strictly positive.
Proof of Proposition 2








(1 − 2α)2(1 − ν)2
[
ν2 + α(1 − α)
(




2(1 − 2α)2 > 0,
where the first inequality follows from α < 1
2
. Since RFCC1 is decreasing in δ, we have
RNC −RFCC1 > 0 for all δ > 0.





2(1 − ν)3 − ∆θ
(
1 − ν + ν2 − 3ν3
)]
> ν(1 − ν)
2
((1 − ν)2 + ν2)2
[
1 − 5ν + 7ν2 − ν3
]
> 0,
where the first inequality holds because it follows from (A.5) and Assumption 2 that
∆θ 6 (1 − ν)
2
(1 − ν)2 + ν2 .
We have shown that RNC −RC1 > 0, hence the agents (as a group) will always
be willing to pay the principal up to the amount given by RNC −RC1 . Notice that,
by Proposition 1, the principal’s threat to implement internal control is credible. If
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the principal accepts their offer, her payoff is given by
ΠC2 = ΠNC +RNC −RC1 = WNC −RC1 .
If she rejects the offer, her payoff is ΠC1 = WC1 −RC1 . Hence WNC > WC1 implies
ΠC2 > ΠC1 .
Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that α > 0 and the following condition holds:
WNC −WFCC1 − α(∆θ)
2 (α(1 − ν) + 2ν) > 0 . (A.8)
To see that there exists a set with non-empty interior for which condition (A.8)







1 − ν > 0
and WFCC1 −WNC is given by (A.6). Since W
FC
C1
is continuous in δ, condition (A.8)
will also hold for sufficiently small δ > 0.
Consider two reporting functions:





θl + 1 − ∆θ ν1−ν if x ∈
[




for some α̂ > α > 0. We have m(r1) = α̂∆θ > 0 = m(r0). Since WNC −WFCC1 > 0,
the principal prefers to offer contract C2. Under contract NC, the effort levels
required of the efficient and inefficient agents, eh and el, are given by (2.7):
eh = 1 , el = 1 − ∆θ
ν
1 − ν .
Suppose that the principal sets α = α̂. In the hl-case, when the efficient agent
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i claims to be inefficient and exerts the effort of el −∆θ, the levels of output will be
xi = θl + 1 − ∆θ
ν
1 − ν + α̂∆θ,
xj = θl + 1 − ∆θ
ν
1 − ν − α̂∆θ,
where i, j = A,B and i 6= j. With reporting function r1, instead of xi and xj given
above, the principal observes, for both agents, x = θl + 1 − ∆θ ν1−ν , the levels of
output required of inefficient agents. Furthermore, the agents cannot reduce their
effort levels without being detected. In the ll-case, however, the agents can reduce
their effort levels from el to el − α̂∆θ without being detected, and the principal
compensates them only for these lower effort levels. For the same reason, information
rents collected by the efficient agents in the hh-case are given by Φ(el−α̂∆θ). Notice
that reporting function r1 does not distort output levels when the agents exert eh.
Agency welfare with reporting function r1 is given by
W (r1) = 2ν
(
θh + eh − 12(eh)
2
)
+ 2(1 − ν)
(
θl + (el − α̂∆θ) − 12 (el − α̂∆θ)
2
)
= WNC − α̂(∆θ)2 (α̂(1 − ν) + 2ν) .
Next, we have
ΠC2(r1) = ΠNC(r1) +RNC −RC1
= 2ν
(
θh + eh − 12 (eh)
2 − Φ(el − α̂∆θ)
)
+ 2(1 − ν)
(




Since RNC and RC1 do not depend on α̂, the following inequality holds:
∂
∂α̂
ΠC2(r1) = −2α̂(∆θ)2(1 − ν) < 0.
That is, the principal implements α̂ = α but uses α = α in negotiating the agent’t
concession in exchange for not implementing internal control. By assumption, we
have
W (r1) −WFCC1 = WNC −W
FC
C1
− α(∆θ)2 (α(1 − ν) + 2ν) > 0. (A.9)
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Hence, by Proposition 2, Π(r1) − Π(r0) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2





hh − tAhh + eBhh − tBhh
)
+ ν (1 − ν)
(
θh + θl + e
A
hl − tAhl + eBhl − tBhl
)
+ ν (1 − ν)
(
θl + θh + e
A
lh − tAlh + eBlh − tBlh
)












































































































































with the additional nonnegativity constraints.





= ν2 − eAhh (λ1 + µ1) 6 0 , eAhh
∂L
∂eAhh
= 0 , (A.10)
∂L
∂tAhh
= −ν2 + λ1 + µ1 6 0 , tAhh
∂L
∂tAhh
= 0 . (A.11)
From (A.10), it follows that eAhh > 0. Participation constraint (3.7) then implies
that tAhh > 0 and, therefore, by (A.11) λ1 + µ1 = ν
2. Thus eAhh = 1. It follows from












2 and thus µ1 = 0
and λ1 = ν
2. Proceeding in a similar fashion, we find that eBhh = 1 and µ5 = ν
2.
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There are four (potential) cases to consider, depending on the binding accep-
tance constraints (3.5) and (3.6).
Case 1 (ξ1 = 0, ξ2 = 0): Full Collusion





= ν(1 − ν) − eAlh (λ3 + µ3) 6 0 , eAlh
∂L
∂eAlh
= 0 , (A.12)
∂L
∂tAlh
= −ν(1 − ν) + λ3 + µ3 6 0 , tAlh
∂L
∂tAlh
= 0 . (A.13)















2, hence µ3 = 0. Then
(A.12) and (A.13) imply that λ3 = ν(1 − ν); thus eAlh = 1. In a similar fashion, we
find that λ2 = ν(1 − ν), µ3 = µ6 = 0, and µ8 = 1 − ν. To summarize, the agents’





lh = 1, (A.14)
where i = A,B.
Next, substituting the values of λ1–λ3 and simplifying, we can write the Kuhn-





= (1 − ν)2 − ν∆θ1 − 2α− δ (α− ν(1 − α))
(1 − 2α)(1 + δ) − e
A




= 0 , (A.16)
∂L
∂tAll
= −1 + ν(1 − ν) + µ4 6 0 , tAll
∂L
∂tAll
= 0 . (A.17)
From (A.17) we have µ4 = 1 − ν(1 − ν). Also, from Assumption 2 we know that
eAll > 0, hence it follows from (A.16) that (A.16) holds with equality and, after
simplification, we obtain:
eAll = 1 − ∆θ
ν
(1 − ν)2
1 − 2α− δ (α− ν(1 − α))
(1 − 2α)(1 + δ) . (A.18)
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Following similar steps, we find that
eBll = 1 − ∆θ
ν
(1 − ν)2
1 − 2α− δα(1 − ν)
(1 − 2α)(1 + δ) . (A.19)












the effort levels (A.18) and (A.19); it is given by
α1 =
(1 + δ)(4 + δ)(1 − ν)2 − ∆θ
(





4(1 + δ)(2 + δ)(1 − ν)2 − ∆θ [(2 + δ)(1 + δ + 2ν) + ν2 (2 − δ(δ − 3))] ,
where
M1 = (1 − ν)4(1 + δ)
(
δ2 + 4∆θ(1 + δ)
)
− (∆θ)2(1 + δ)(1 − ν)
[
(1 + δ)2 + ν(1 − ν)(1 − δ2) − ν3(1 − δ)(1 + 3δ)
]
.
The Full Collusion (FC) region is then characterized by α 6 α1 .
Case 2 (ξ1 > 0, ξ2 = 0)
From (A.18) and (A.19), we obtain




(1 − ν)2 > 0 ,

































That is, ξ2 = 0 implies ξ1 = 0 and, therefore, it cannot be the case that ξ1 > 0 and
ξ2 = 0.
Case 3 (ξ1 = 0, ξ2 > 0): Partial Collusion I
Now, constraint (3.6) is satisfied with equality and thus individual rationality con-
straint (3.3) takes the form of the corresponding incentive compatibility constraint,
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tBhl > 12(eBhl)2. The optimal effort levels eAll and eBll are given by:
eAll = 1 − ∆θ
ν
(1 − ν)2
(1 − α)ν − α
(1 − 2α)(1 + δ) , (A.20)
eBll = 1 − ∆θ
ν
(1 − ν)2
1 − α(1 + ν)
(1 − 2α)(1 + δ) . (A.21)












levels are (A.20) and (A.21); it is given by
α2 =
(1 + δ)(4 + δ)(1 − ν)2 − ∆θ
[









(1 + δ)(4 + δ)(1 − ν)2 − ∆θ
(




2(1 + δ)(1 − ν)2 − ∆θ
(





4(1 + δ)(2 + δ)(1 − ν)2 − ∆θ
(
2 + δ(3 + δ) − 2δν + ν2 (6 + δ(7 + 3δ))
)]
.
The Partial Collusion I (PC I) region is characterized by α1 < α 6 α2.
Case 4 (ξ1 > 0, ξ2 > 0): Partial Collusion
The Partial Collusion (PC) region is characterized by α > max{α1, α2}. Now, both
constraints (3.5) and (3.6) are satisfied with equality and can be replaced by the
corresponding individual rationality constraints. The optimal effort levels eAll and
eBll are given by:
eAll = 1 − ∆θ
ν2
(1 − ν)2 , (A.22)






Since the objective function is (weakly) concave and the constraint set is con-
vex, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are sufficient as well as necessary.
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Solution to Problem D1





hh − tAhh + eBhh − tBhh
)
+ ν (1 − ν)
(
θh + θl + e
A
hl − tAhl + eBhl − tBhl
)
+ ν (1 − ν)
(
θl + θh + e
A
lh − tAlh + eBlh − tBlh
)








































































































































with the additional nonnegativity constraints.





= ν2 − eAhh (λ1 + µ1) 6 0 , eAhh
∂L
∂eAhh
= 0 , (A.24)
∂L
∂tAhh
= −ν2 + λ1 + µ1 6 0 , tAhh
∂L
∂tAhh
= 0 . (A.25)
From (A.24) we have eAhh > 0. Participation constraint (4.6) then implies that
tAhh > 0 and it follows from (A.25) that λ1 +µ1 = ν
2. Thus eAhh = 1. By Assumption
2, Φ(eAll ) > 0 and Φ(e
B





(eAhh) and, therefore, µ1 = 0 and λ1 = ν
2.
Proceeding in a similar fashion, we find that eBhh = 1 and µ5 = ν
2.
There are now four cases to consider, depending on whether or not acceptance
constrains (4.3) and (4.4) are binding.
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Case 1 (ξ1 = 0, ξ2 = 0): Full Collusion.





= ν(1 − ν) − eAhl (λ2 + µ2) 6 0 , eAhl
∂L
∂eAhl
= 0 , (A.26)
∂L
∂tAhl
= −ν(1 − ν) + λ2 + µ2 6 0 , tAhl
∂L
∂tAhl
= 0 . (A.27)












2, hence µ2 = 0.
Then (A.26) and (A.27) imply that λ2 = ν(1−ν); thus eAhl = 1. In a similar fashion,





lh = 1, (A.28)
where i = A,B.
Next, substituting the values of λ1–λ3 and simplifying, we can write the Kuhn-





= (1 − ν)2 − ν∆θ − eAll (µ4 − ν(2 − ν)) 6 0 , eAll
∂L
∂eAll
= 0 , (A.29)
∂L
∂tAll
= −1 + µ4 6 0 , tAll
∂L
∂tAll
= 0 . (A.30)
From (A.30) we have µ4 = 1. Also, it follows from Assumption 2 that e
A
ll > 0, hence,
after simplification, we obtain from (A.29):
eAll = 1 − ∆θ
ν
(1 − ν)2 . (A.31)
Finally, substituting the values of λ1–λ3 and simplifying, we can write the
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= (1 − ν)2 − eBll µ8 − ∆θν
1 − α
(
2 + δ(2 + δ)(1 − ν)
)











From (A.34) if follows that µ8 = (1 − ν)2, thus (A.32) can be written as
∂L
∂eBll






1 − δ 1 + α
(
δ(1 − ν) − 2ν
)
(1 − 2α)(1 + δ)
}
6 0 .
By Assumption 2, we have eBll > 0, hence (A.33) implies that (A.32) holds with
equality and the value of eBll is given by




1 − δ 1 + α
(
δ(1 − ν) − 2ν
)
(1 − 2α)(1 + δ)
}
. (A.35)




















, where the effort levels
are given by (A.31) and (A.35). The Full Collusion (FC) region is then characterized
by α 6 α0 ≡ min {α1, α2}.











where the effort levels are given by (A.31) and (A.35). That is, the employees do
not collude when the supervisor is efficient and the agent is not, hence constraint




Notice that in the PCI region constraint (4.4) is not binding. After simplification,
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the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker conditions for eAll and e
B
ll take the following form:
∂L
∂eAll




− ∆θν ν − α(1 + ν)












− ∆θν 1 − α(1 + ν)






By Assumption 2, eAll > 0 and e
B
ll > 0, hence the effort levels are given by
eAll = 1 − ∆θ
ν
(1 − ν)2
ν − α(1 + ν)
1 − 2α , (A.36)
eBll = 1 − ∆θ
ν
(1 − ν)2
1 − α(1 + ν)
(1 − 2α)(1 + δ) , (A.37)












the effort levels are given by (A.36) and (A.37). The Partial Collusion I (PCI) region
is then characterized by α0 < α 6 α3 .
Case 3 (ξ1 = 0, ξ2 > 0): Partial Collusion II.
In this region, constraint (4.3) is satisfied with equality but constraint (4.4) is bind-
ing: the employees collude in the hl-case only when the supervisor is efficient.





. We have the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
∂L
∂eAll




− ∆θν 1 − α(1 + ν)
















− α(1 + δ)(1 − ν)
1 − 2α
)




The optimal effort levels eAll and e
B
ll are given by:
eAll = 1 − ∆θ
ν
(1 − ν)2
1 − α(1 + ν)
1 − 2α , (A.38)




















the effort levels are given by (A.38) and (A.39). The Partial Collusion II (PCII)
region is characterized by α0 < α 6 α4.
Case 4 (ξ1 > 0, ξ2 > 0): Partial Collusion III.
The Partial Collusion III (PCIII) region is characterized by α > max{α3, α4}.
Now, both constraints (4.3) and (4.4) are satisfied with equality and, therefore, con-
straints (4.1) and (4.2) can be replaced by the corresponding individual rationality
constraints. The optimal effort levels eAll and e
B
ll are given by:
eAll = 1 − ∆θ
ν2
(1 − ν)2 ,






Since the objective function is (weakly) concave and the constraint set is convex,
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are sufficient as well as necessary.
Proof of Proposition 5





The effort levels under contract D1 are given by (A.28), (A.31), and (A.35). After














(2 − ∆θ)(1 + ν2) − 4ν
}
.
By Assumption 2, we have eAll − ∆θ > 0 (since α > 12 ), hence the following
condition is satisfied with respect to ∆θ:
∆θ <
(1 − ν)2
1 − ν(1 − ν) .
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Thus we can write:
(2 − ∆θ)(1 + ν2) − 4ν > (1 − ν)
4
1 − ν(1 − ν) > 0,
which establishes the result.
Proof of Proposition 6
By the continuity of the principal’s expected payoff in ν, for κ sufficiently close to
1 the same constraints will be binding in the full collusion region as in the solution
to Problem D1. Consider first the case where the principal appoints agent A to a























+ ν (1 − κν)
(



















+ (1 − ν)κν
(








































lh = 1 = efb , where i = A,B ,
eAll = 1 − ∆θ
ν
(1 − ν)(1 − κν)
1 − α(1 + κ)
1 − 2α , (A.40)
eBll = 1 − ∆θ
ν
(1 − ν)(1 − κν)
κ(1 − α) − α
(
1 + δ(2 + δ)(1 − κν)
)
(1 − 2α)(1 + δ) . (A.41)
Next, consider the case where the principal appoints agent B to the supervisory
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+ ν(1 − κν)
(





















+ (1 − ν)κν
(






































lh = 1 = efb , where i = A,B ,
eAll = 1 − ∆θ
ν
(1 − ν)(1 − κν)
1 + α
(
κνδ(2 + δ) − 1
)
− κα(1 + δ)2
(1 − 2α)(1 + δ) , (A.42)
eBll = 1 − ∆θ
ν
(1 − ν)(1 − κν)
κ− α(1 + κ)
1 − 2α . (A.43)
After substituting the effort levels given by (A.40)–(A.43) in the corresponding
objective functions and simplifying, we obtain:
ΠA − ΠB = ∆θδν(κ− 1)
2(1 − 2α)2(1 + δ)2(1 − ν)(1 − κν)×
×
{
2(1 − 2α)(1 + δ)
(
1 − α(2 + δ)
)







2 − α(2 + δ)
))








1 + δ − α
(
6 + 4δ − α(2 + δ)
(




The sign of ΠA − ΠB is determined by the sign of the expression in the curly
brackets. For δ < 1
α
−2, it will be positive provided that ∆θ is not too high. Solving
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ΠA − ΠB = 0 for ∆θ yields:
∆θ1 = 2(1 − 2α)(1 + δ)
(
1 − α(2 + δ)
)










α(2 + δ) − 2
))








1 + δ − α
(
6 + 4δ + α(2 + δ)
(









Proof of Proposition 7
The proof is structured as follows: I assume that the constraints specified in the
text are binding, characterize the conditions under which the remaining constraints
are slack, and compare the principal’s payoff under the two contracts: D2 and C1
with δ = 0, which I denote ΠD2 and Π0, respectively. Diagrammatically, the binding
incentive compatibility constrains are depicted in Figure A.1.
hh hl
lllh
Figure A.1: The binding incentive compatibility constraints.
Substituting the values of Ulh and Ull given by (4.14) and (4.15), which col-
lectively constitute the (lh → ll) constraint, and the binding constraints given by
(4.16) and (4.17) into the principal’s objective function, we can solve for eijk. The
solution is given by (4.18) and (4.19).
Note, for future reference, that the optimal effort levels under the benchmark
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lh = 1 = efb , where i = A,B ,
eAll = e
B
ll = 1 − ∆θ
ν
(1 − ν)2 ≡ eb .








> 0, which holds
for
∆θ 6 ∆θΨb ≡
2(1 − 2α)2(1 − ν)2
1 + ν2 − 2α(1 − α)(1 + ν)2 . (A.44)
In the remainder of the proof, I group the constraints to be checked by type.
Acceptance constraints. Substituting the effort levels given by (4.18) and (4.19)





















(1 − 2α)2(1 − ν)2 > 0 ,











2(1 − 2α)2(1 − ν2)×
×
{
2(1 − 2α)2(1 − ν2) − ∆θ
(




which is satisfied for
∆θ 6 ∆θΨ ≡ 2(1 − 2α)
2(1 − ν)2
(1 − 2α(1 − α)) (1 + ν2) . (A.46)
Participation constraints. By construction, the participation constraint for an
inefficient supervisor, (4.11), is satisfied with equality. The participation constraint

































It is satisfied if and only if the following condition holds:
∆θ 6 ∆θP ≡ 2(1 − 2α)
2(1 − ν)2




2 − ν(3 − 2ν)
)) .
It is easy to check that the denominator in the above expression is always positive.








2 − ν(3 − 2ν)
))
(1 − 2α(1 − α)) (1 + ν2)






−4ν(1 − 2α)(1 − ν)2
(1 − 2α(1 − α))2 (1 + ν2)
< 0.
It follows that the participation constraint is implied by the acceptance constraint
(A.45). As a consequence, the incentive compatibility of contract D2 implies that
the expected net transfer for an efficient supervisor is positive.
Incentive compatibility constraints. By assumption, in the hh-case it is more
profitable for the supervisor to claim that the realization of parameters is ll than
to claim that it is lh, i.e., the (hh → lh) constraint is not binding. This will be the






























which is equivalent to
2α(1 − 2α) (1 − ν(1 − ν)) − ν > 0 ⇔
⇔ν 6 νic1 ≡




1 + α (3α(2 − α) − 4)
)
4α(1 − α) . (A.47)
Likewise, the supervisor in the hl-case should not benefit by, instead of claim-
ing that the efficiency parameters are ll, claiming that the parameters are lh and
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enforcing the effort levels given by
êA = eAlh − ∆θ
1
1 − 2α and ê
B = eBlh + ∆θ
1
1 − 2α .
That is, the (hl → lh) constraint should be slack, which will be the case if the




































where I use the shorthand c(e) = 1
2
(e)2 to save space. After simplification, we find






















is implied by constraint (A.47).
Next, the supervisor in the hh-case should not benefit from claiming the hl-case.











































(1 − 2α)2(1 − ν)2
[
2 − ν(3 − 2ν) − 2α
(
1 − ν(1 − ν)
)]
.
It is easy to check that the expression in square brackets is always positive, hence
the constraint, which I label (hh → hl), is slack.
Inverse incentive compatibility constraints. Since net transfers in ll- and hl-
cases can be negative, the supervisor may benefit by claiming that either he, the
agent, or both are more efficient than is the case. Therefore, I have to check the
following inverse incentive compatibility constraints.
The (ll → lh) constraint is not binding if the supervisor does not benefit from
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(1 − 2α)2(1 − ν)2
[
(1 − ν)2 − 2α(1 − α)
(
1 − ν(1 − ν)
)]
.
Substituting νic1 in the expression in the square brackets, it is easy to check that
constraint (ll → lh) is implied by constraint (A.47).

























(1 − 2α)2(1 − ν)2×
×
[
2 + 2(1 − α)
(
αν(2 + ∆θ) − 4α
)
− ν(4 + ∆θ) + 2ν2(1 − 2α)2
]
> 0 .
Solving the expression in the square brackets for ∆θ, we can rewrite constraint
(ll → hl) as follows:
∆θ 6 ∆θic ≡
2(1 − 2α)2(1 − ν)2











hence the (ll → hl) constraint is implied by the acceptance constraint (A.45).































4(1 + ν)2 − ν(8 + ∆θ)
]
> 0 ,
which is equivalent to ∆θ 6 4
ν
(1 − ν)2. Since
ν∆θΨ
4(1 − ν)2 =
ν(1 − 2α)2





the (ll → hh) constraint is again implied by the acceptance constraint (A.45)

































(1 − 2α)2(1 − ν)2
[
(1 − 2α)2(1 + ν2) − 2
(
1 − 3α(1 − α)
)]
> 0 ,
which is equivalent to
ν 6 νic2 ≡




2 − 7α(1 − α)
)
(1 − 2α)2 . (A.49)
To summarize, contract D2 is incentive compatible if and only if the following
conditions are satisfied:
∆θ 6 ∆θΨ,
ν 6 min {νic1, νic2} ,
where the constraints are given by (A.46), (A.47), and (A.49), respectively.
Comparison with the benchmark contract. It follows from the characteriza-
tion above that contract D2 describes the full collusion setting. For the comparison
between the two contracts, we thus have to confine our attention to the full collusion
region of the benchmark contract, which is given by (A.44). It turns out that the
acceptance constraint of contract D2 always implies the acceptance constraint of the
benchmark contract. To see this, observe that
∆θΨ
∆θΨb
= 1 − 4να(1 − α)
(1 − 2α(1 − α)(1 + ν2)) < 1 .
Substituting the values for corresponding effort levels in the objective functions
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and simpifying yields:
ΠD2 − Π0 =
∆θν
2(1 − 2α)2(1 − ν)2×
[
2(1 − 2α)2(1 − ν)2 + ∆θ
((












, constraint (A.47) implies that it is always positive. Solving for ∆θ,
we find that (A.50) is nonnegative if and only if the following condition is satisfied:
∆θ 6 ∆θΠ ≡
2(1 − 2α)2(1 − ν)2
(




= 1 − ν (1 + 2α(1 − α))
(1 − 2α(1 − α)) (1 + ν2) < 1 ,
hence the difference (A.50) is always positive if the acceptance constraint (A.46) is
not binding.
Proof of Corollary 2
After substitution and simplification, we obtain:
∂
∂α
ΠD2 = ν (∆θ)
2 1 − ν(1 − ν)(3 − 2ν)
(1 − 2α)3(1 − ν)2 > 0,
which establishes the claim.
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Proof of Proposition 9
Solving the two versions of the principal’s objective function, substituting the effort






2(1 − 2α)2(1 − ν)(1 − κν)×
×
[
2(1 − 2α)2(1 − ν)(1 − κν) − ∆θ (1 − 2α(1 − α)) (1 + κν2)
]
,
which is positive for
∆θ <
2(1 − 2α)2(1 − ν)(1 − κν)
(1 − 2α(1 − α)) (1 + κν2)
because, by assumption, κ > 1.
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